fix: security audit F5–F7 + Pi CI races (bundle) #12

Merged
sirius merged 6 commits from feat/audit-fixes-bundle into main 2026-09-11 00:41:40 +00:00
5 changed files with 70 additions and 12 deletions
Showing only changes of commit 45c105de8a - Show all commits

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@ -190,8 +190,8 @@ Treat the backup file like the sqlite db.
Composer (bottom of the roster screen):
- `/wipe` — confirm by typing `WIPE`. Overwrites the message log and `VACUUM`s. Identity key and friends stay.
- `/wipe-all` — confirm by typing `WIPEALL`. Deletes the data dir. Next start is a **new person** (new identity key). Esc cancels. Nothing is wiped without confirm.
- `/wipe` — confirm by typing `WIPE`. Chat and payments history gone (overwrite message bodies, drop `payments`, `VACUUM`, WAL checkpoint). Identity key and friends stay. Not a forensic erase (SSD wear-leveling). `/wipe-all` is the identity burn.
- `/wipe-all` — confirm by typing `WIPEALL`. Deletes the data dir. Next start is a **new person** (new identity key). Same disk caveat. Esc cancels. Nothing is wiped without confirm.
## Uninstall
@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ Still plaintext on disk (unless you add OS/FDE):
- your identity secret key (`self.identity_sk`)
- friend public keys and current locators
The message key is **not** wrapped with `identity_sk` (that key is in the same file). sqlcipher is out of v1. `/wipe` overwrites message bodies and vacuums; `/wipe-all` deletes the data dir. Ctrl-Q can clear history on the way out (`CLEAR`) without becoming a new person.
The message key is **not** wrapped with `identity_sk` (that key is in the same file). sqlcipher is out of v1. `/wipe` deletes chat and payments history; it is not a forensic erase. Roster and identity stay. `/wipe-all` deletes the data dir (new identity). Ctrl-Q can clear history on the way out (`CLEAR`) without becoming a new person.
Threat model: [`docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`](docs/THREAT_MODEL.md).

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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ A signed `loc` frame (`onion`, `ts`, `sig`) rewrites a friends locator **only
Chat bodies in sqlite are ChaCha20-Poly1305 (`nonce || ciphertext` in the `messages.plaintext` column) with AAD `owmsg1 || friend_id_le64 || dir || 0x00 || row_id_le64`. Swapping ciphertext between rows fails closed. A random 32-byte data key is wrapped with Argon2id (same params as identity backup) from a non-empty passphrase. Salt + wrapped key live in `store_meta`. Unlock is fail-closed: wrong or empty passphrase does not open chat. Empty-AAD v0.2 blobs are rewrapped once on unlock; `list_messages` never falls back to empty AAD.
Identity secret key, friend public keys, and locators remain plaintext in the same db. The message key is not wrapped with `identity_sk` (that key is already on disk). A seized laptop still yields who you talk to and your identity unless you add OS/FDE. sqlcipher is out of v1. `/wipe` overwrites message bodies and vacuums; `/wipe-all` deletes the data dir.
Identity secret key, friend public keys, and locators remain plaintext in the same db. The message key is not wrapped with `identity_sk` (that key is already on disk). A seized laptop still yields who you talk to and your identity unless you add OS/FDE. sqlcipher is out of v1. `/wipe` deletes chat and payments history (overwrite message bodies, `VACUUM`, WAL checkpoint); roster and identity stay. It is not a forensic erase — SSD wear-leveling can keep copies. `/wipe-all` deletes the data dir (new identity); same disk caveat.
## Fail closed

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@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
use rand::RngCore;
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
use rusqlite::{Connection, OptionalExtension, params};
use rand::RngCore;
use rusqlite::{params, Connection, OptionalExtension};
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey as X25519Public, StaticSecret};
pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;
@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ impl Store {
if !journal.eq_ignore_ascii_case("wal") {
return Err(Error(format!("journal_mode WAL failed: {journal}")));
}
// Overwrite freed pages on DELETE. Flash wear-leveling can still keep copies;
// this is not a forensic / SSD crypto-shred.
conn.pragma_update(None, "secure_delete", "ON")?;
conn.execute_batch(
"
PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
@ -748,14 +751,17 @@ impl Store {
Ok(out)
}
/// Overwrite message bodies, delete rows, VACUUM. Identity + friends stay.
/// Drop chat + payments history. Identity + friends stay.
/// Not a forensic erase: SSD wear-leveling can keep copies.
pub fn wipe_messages(&self) -> Result<()> {
self.conn.execute(
"UPDATE messages SET plaintext = zeroblob(length(plaintext))",
[],
)?;
self.conn.execute("DELETE FROM messages", [])?;
self.conn.execute("DELETE FROM payments", [])?;
self.conn.execute_batch("VACUUM")?;
self.conn.execute_batch("PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)")?;
Ok(())
}

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@ -318,8 +318,9 @@ pub fn parse_slash(raw: &str) -> Option<WipeKind> {
pub fn wipe_screen_text(kind: WipeKind) -> &'static str {
match kind {
WipeKind::Messages => {
"Wipe message log?\n\
"Wipe chat and payments history?\n\
Identity key and friends stay.\n\
Not a forensic erase.\n\
Type WIPE to confirm Esc to cancel"
}
WipeKind::All => {

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@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
//! M5: wipe messages (keep identity + friends); wipe-all is a new person.
use onionwire::Store;
use onionwire::tui::{
QuitDecision, QuitPrompt, WipeDecision, WipeKind, WipePrompt, parse_slash, quit_screen_text,
wipe_screen_text,
parse_slash, quit_screen_text, wipe_screen_text, QuitDecision, QuitPrompt, WipeDecision,
WipeKind, WipePrompt,
};
use onionwire::{PaymentWrite, Store};
// Official mainnet standard from Monero docs (same fixture as tests/pay.rs).
const MAINNET_STD: &str = "4AdUndXHHZ6cfufTMvppY6JwXNouMBzSkbLYfpAV5Usx3skxNgYeYTRj5UzqtReoS44qo9mtmXCqY45DJ852K5Jv2684Rge";
fn pk(tag: u8) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut k = [0u8; 32];
@ -50,6 +53,53 @@ fn wipe_clears_messages_keeps_self_and_friends() {
);
}
#[test]
fn wipe_clears_payments_keeps_self_and_friends() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
let store = Store::open_at_with_passphrase(dir.path(), "onionwire-test").expect("open");
let me = store.self_identity().unwrap();
store
.upsert_friend(&pk(1), "a.onion", Some("alice"))
.unwrap();
store
.append_message(&pk(1), "out", b"secret-log-line-xyz")
.unwrap();
store
.insert_payment(
&pk(1),
PaymentWrite {
dir: "out",
kind: "receipt",
amount_atomic: "1000000000000",
address: MAINNET_STD,
memo: "counterparty-memo-xyz",
txid: Some("aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899"),
verified: true,
},
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(store.list_messages(&pk(1)).unwrap().len(), 1);
assert_eq!(store.list_payments(&pk(1)).unwrap().len(), 1);
store.wipe_messages().expect("wipe");
assert!(store.list_messages(&pk(1)).unwrap().is_empty());
assert!(
store.list_payments(&pk(1)).unwrap().is_empty(),
"wipe must drop payments, not only chat"
);
assert_eq!(store.friend_count().unwrap(), 1);
let f = store.get_friend(&pk(1)).unwrap().expect("friend");
assert_eq!(f.petname.as_deref(), Some("alice"));
let me2 = store.self_identity().unwrap();
assert_eq!(me.identity_pk, me2.identity_pk);
drop(store);
assert!(
!db_contains(dir.path(), b"counterparty-memo-xyz"),
"wipe must not leave payment memo in the db file"
);
}
#[test]
fn wipe_all_removes_dir_so_next_open_is_new_identity() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
@ -108,8 +158,9 @@ fn wipe_all_requires_typing_wipeall() {
#[test]
fn wipe_prompt_text_matches_spec() {
let m = wipe_screen_text(WipeKind::Messages);
assert!(m.contains("Wipe message log?"));
assert!(m.contains("Wipe chat and payments history?"));
assert!(m.contains("Identity key and friends stay."));
assert!(m.contains("Not a forensic erase."));
assert!(m.contains("Type WIPE to confirm"));
assert!(m.contains("Esc to cancel"));
let a = wipe_screen_text(WipeKind::All);