Merge pull request 'feat(tui): fail-closed /file transfer (1 MiB)' (#16) from feat/tui-file-transfer into main

Reviewed-on: #16

.forgejo/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -8,12 +8,18 @@ on:
   pull_request:
   workflow_dispatch:
 
+# One cargo job on the Pi at a time. Overlapping PR+main runs shared the
+# container name `onionwire-ci` (docker Conflict) and OOM-killed with 137.
+concurrency:
+  group: onionwire-ci-pi
+  cancel-in-progress: false
+
 env:
   CARGO_TERM_COLOR: never
   RUST_IMAGE: rust:1.91-bookworm
   CARGO_REGISTRY_VOLUME: onionwire-cargo-registry
   CARGO_TARGET_VOLUME: onionwire-target-ci
-  BUILD_CONTAINER: onionwire-ci
+  BUILD_CONTAINER: onionwire-ci-${{ github.run_id }}
 
 jobs:
   test:

.forgejo/workflows/release.yml

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ env:
   RUST_IMAGE: rust:1.91-bookworm
   CARGO_REGISTRY_VOLUME: onionwire-cargo-registry
   CARGO_TARGET_VOLUME: onionwire-target-aarch64
-  BUILD_CONTAINER: onionwire-release-build
+  BUILD_CONTAINER: onionwire-release-build-${{ github.run_id }}
 
 jobs:
   aarch64:

Cargo.lock

@@ -2359,6 +2359,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "regex-automata",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "md-5"
+version = "0.10.6"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d89e7ee0cfbedfc4da3340218492196241d89eefb6dab27de5df917a6d2e78cf"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "digest 0.10.7",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "memchr"
 version = "2.8.3"
@@ -2619,18 +2629,22 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "onionwire"
-version = "0.2.0"
+version = "0.2.1"
 dependencies = [
  "argon2",
  "arti-client",
  "chacha20poly1305",
  "ed25519-dalek",
  "futures",
+ "md-5",
  "rand 0.8.8",
  "ratatui",
+ "rpassword",
  "rusqlite",
  "safelog",
  "serde_json",
+ "sha2",
+ "sha3 0.10.9",
  "snow",
  "tempfile",
  "tokio",
@@ -3369,6 +3383,17 @@ dependencies = [
  "windows-sys 0.52.0",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "rpassword"
+version = "7.5.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "2da316a15f47e3d053de9cb2c439650bd8fa4aaeb9365f2e5f27f492ff73c196"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+ "rtoolbox",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "rsa"
 version = "0.9.10"
@@ -3390,6 +3415,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "rtoolbox"
+version = "0.0.6"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "9a1efe12a1469752d0e6ff5ebec0b6ef4924cc5c4c71046b0ec730040535819d"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "rusqlite"
 version = "0.36.0"

Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "onionwire"
-version = "0.2.0"
+version = "0.2.1"
 edition = "2024"
 rust-version = "1.91"
 description = "Lean Tor messenger: Arti in-process, identity=pubkey, onion=locator. No XMPP."
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ snow = "0.10"
 serde_json = "1"
 argon2 = "0.5"
 chacha20poly1305 = "0.10"
+sha3 = "0.10"
+sha2 = "0.10"
+md-5 = "0.10"
+rpassword = "7"
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 tempfile = "3"

README.md

@@ -108,9 +108,9 @@ onionwire
 
 or `cargo run --release`.
 
-On start you are prompted for a store passphrase (or set `ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE`). Empty passphrase is rejected; a wrong passphrase does not open chat. Then you should see `onionwire: bootstrapping Arti…` on stderr. Directory bootstrap is usually under a minute; the onion is ready once a probe connect works (combined Arti status may still say Bootstrapping). Fail closed at 360s. Data lives in `ONIONWIRE_HOME` if set, otherwise `~/.local/share/onionwire/` (`onionwire.db` + Arti state, mode 0700). First open creates an ed25519 identity key. That key **is** you.
+On start you are prompted for a store passphrase (echo off, like other CLI passwords) or set `ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE`. Empty passphrase is rejected; a wrong passphrase does not open chat. Then you should see `onionwire: bootstrapping Arti…` on stderr. Directory bootstrap is usually under a minute; the onion is ready once a probe connect works (combined Arti status may still say Bootstrapping). Fail closed at 360s. Data lives in `ONIONWIRE_HOME` if set, otherwise `~/.local/share/onionwire/` (`onionwire.db` + Arti state, mode 0700). First open creates an ed25519 identity key. That key **is** you.
 
-Then `F2` to share your invite, `F3` to paste a friend’s. Mouse-select the `onionwire:v1:…` line to copy.
+Then `F2` to share your invite, `F3` to paste a friend’s. Mouse-select the `onionwire:v1:…` line to copy. Highlight them in the roster, type in the composer, Enter to send. Fail closed: if their onion is down, send fails — no outbox.
 
 ## Friends are keys
 
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ Focus starts on the composer so typing works immediately. `Tab` cycles panes; `j
 | `F3` | Paste a friend’s invite |
 | `F4` | Rotate **onion** (locator only) |
 | `F5` | Selected friend’s profile (`/who`) |
-| Enter | Run `/wipe`, `/wipe-all`, `/profile`, `/who`, `/pay`, `/tip`, `/backup`, `/restore` from the composer |
+| Enter | Send chat to the selected friend, or run a `/command` |
 | `Esc` | Close overlay / back to Main / clear composer |
 | `Ctrl-Q` | Quit: type `CLEAR`+Enter to wipe history, `QUIT`+Enter to leave it, Esc to stay |
 
@@ -156,19 +156,31 @@ Give that string to a friend. They `F3` paste it (`(o) paste invite`). Unknown `
 
 If a peer’s onion is down, send fails. v1 has no outbox, no retry queue, no DHT, no name server. There is still no hosted chat server.
 
+## File transfer
+
+`/file /path` sends a local file to the selected friend. Both must be online.
+Cap 1 MiB on send and receive. Fail closed: a bad chunk or hash mismatch
+deletes the partial (never overwrite). Files land in
+`$ONIONWIRE_HOME/inbox/<fingerprint>/`. Chat shows `[file] name (N bytes)`,
+never raw frames. No outbox, no resume, no images in the TUI.
+
 ## Profile
 
 `/profile` edits your friend-visible display name, bio, and optional Monero address (64 / 512 byte limits, no images). Enter saves and one-shot sends a signed `prf` frame to the selected friend. `F5` or `/who` shows their last signed profile. There is no directory: unknown pubkeys are ignored.
 
 ## Monero sidecar
 
-OnionWire is not a wallet. Optional JSON-RPC to a user-hosted `monero-wallet-rpc`:
+OnionWire is not a wallet. Optional JSON-RPC to a user-hosted `monero-wallet-rpc`. The wallet **must** use `--rpc-login`; OnionWire refuses an open RPC (HTTP 200 without a Digest challenge) and refuses URLs with no credentials.
 
 ```bash
+# monero-wallet-rpc --rpc-bind-ip 127.0.0.1 --rpc-bind-port 18083 --rpc-login onionwire:secret
+export ONIONWIRE_WALLET_RPC=http://onionwire:secret@127.0.0.1:18083
+# or keep the password out of the URL:
 export ONIONWIRE_WALLET_RPC=http://127.0.0.1:18083
+export ONIONWIRE_WALLET_RPC_LOGIN=onionwire:secret
 ```
 
-Loopback or `.onion` only, HTTP, 5s timeout. Unset → chat still works; `/pay` and `/tip` say so.
+Loopback only, HTTP Digest (RFC 2617, matching `--rpc-login`), 5s timeout, 1 MiB response cap. `.onion` RPC URLs are rejected (no Arti dial; do not point this at a remote wallet). Unset → chat still works; `/pay` and `/tip` say so. Do not log the RPC password.
 
 - `/pay <xmr> [memo]` — invoice (we want to receive). Uses a wallet subaddress if RPC is up, else the profile `xmr_addr`.
 - `/tip <xmr> [memo]` — pay the selected friend’s profile address, then send a signed `rcp`. Incoming receipts stay unverified until RPC `get_transfers` matches.
@@ -184,14 +196,14 @@ Treat the backup file like the sqlite db.
 
 ## Mixed versions
 
-0.1.2 peers store unknown plaintext as chat. A 0.2 sender of `prf ` / `inv ` / `rcp ` will leave a garbage line on an un-upgraded peer. Upgrade both sides. The Noise handshake is unchanged.
+0.1.2 peers store unknown plaintext as chat. A 0.2 sender of `prf ` / `inv ` / `rcp ` / `fil ` will leave a garbage line on an un-upgraded peer. Upgrade both sides. The Noise handshake is unchanged.
 
 ## Wipe
 
 Composer (bottom of the roster screen):
 
-- `/wipe` — confirm by typing `WIPE`. Overwrites the message log and `VACUUM`s. Identity key and friends stay.
+- `/wipe` — confirm by typing `WIPE`. Chat and payments history gone (overwrite message bodies, drop `payments`, `VACUUM`, WAL checkpoint). Identity key and friends stay. Not a forensic erase (SSD wear-leveling). `/wipe-all` is the identity burn.
-- `/wipe-all` — confirm by typing `WIPEALL`. Deletes the data dir. Next start is a **new person** (new identity key). Esc cancels. Nothing is wiped without confirm.
+- `/wipe-all` — confirm by typing `WIPEALL`. Deletes the data dir. Next start is a **new person** (new identity key). Same disk caveat. Esc cancels. Nothing is wiped without confirm.
 
 ## Uninstall
 
@@ -208,14 +220,14 @@ If you set `ONIONWIRE_HOME`, delete that directory instead.
 
 ## Seized laptop
 
-Chat bodies in sqlite are ChaCha20-Poly1305 (`nonce || ciphertext` in `messages.plaintext`), wrapped by a passphrase-derived Argon2id key. A disk grep of `onionwire.db` must not yield the message log.
+Chat bodies in sqlite are ChaCha20-Poly1305 (`nonce || ciphertext` in `messages.plaintext`) with AAD bound to `friend_id`, `dir`, and row id, wrapped by a passphrase-derived Argon2id key. A disk grep of `onionwire.db` must not yield the message log. Empty-AAD v0.2 blobs are rewrapped once on unlock.
 
 Still plaintext on disk (unless you add OS/FDE):
 
 - your identity secret key (`self.identity_sk`)
 - friend public keys and current locators
 
-The message key is **not** wrapped with `identity_sk` (that key is in the same file). sqlcipher is out of v1. `/wipe` overwrites message bodies and vacuums; `/wipe-all` deletes the data dir. Ctrl-Q can clear history on the way out (`CLEAR`) without becoming a new person.
+The message key is **not** wrapped with `identity_sk` (that key is in the same file). sqlcipher is out of v1. `/wipe` deletes chat and payments history; it is not a forensic erase. Roster and identity stay. `/wipe-all` deletes the data dir (new identity). Ctrl-Q can clear history on the way out (`CLEAR`) without becoming a new person.
 
 Threat model: [`docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`](docs/THREAT_MODEL.md).
 

crates/onionwire-sdk/Cargo.lock

@@ -2507,6 +2507,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "regex-automata",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "md-5"
+version = "0.10.6"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d89e7ee0cfbedfc4da3340218492196241d89eefb6dab27de5df917a6d2e78cf"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "digest 0.10.7",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "memchr"
 version = "2.8.3"
@@ -2750,18 +2760,21 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "onionwire"
-version = "0.2.0"
+version = "0.2.1"
 dependencies = [
  "argon2",
  "arti-client",
  "chacha20poly1305",
  "ed25519-dalek",
  "futures",
+ "md-5",
  "rand 0.8.8",
  "ratatui",
+ "rpassword",
  "rusqlite",
  "safelog",
  "serde_json",
+ "sha3 0.10.9",
  "snow",
  "tokio",
  "tor-cell",
@@ -2776,6 +2789,7 @@ version = "0.1.0"
 dependencies = [
  "arti-client",
  "onionwire",
+ "rustls",
  "thiserror 2.0.20",
  "tokio",
  "uniffi",
@@ -3472,6 +3486,17 @@ dependencies = [
  "windows-sys 0.52.0",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "rpassword"
+version = "7.5.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "2da316a15f47e3d053de9cb2c439650bd8fa4aaeb9365f2e5f27f492ff73c196"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+ "rtoolbox",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "rsa"
 version = "0.9.10"
@@ -3493,6 +3518,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "rtoolbox"
+version = "0.0.6"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "9a1efe12a1469752d0e6ff5ebec0b6ef4924cc5c4c71046b0ec730040535819d"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+ "windows-sys 0.61.2",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "rusqlite"
 version = "0.36.0"
@@ -3553,6 +3588,7 @@ checksum = "6725596c3f2c3a0aef021139e145d4eafe314a6623e4680ca83852b2c67ab2ba"
 dependencies = [
  "log",
  "once_cell",
+ "ring",
  "rustls-pki-types",
  "rustls-webpki",
  "subtle",

crates/onionwire-sdk/Cargo.toml

@@ -32,6 +32,17 @@ arti-client = { version = "0.46", default-features = false, features = [
     "static-sqlite",
 ] }
 tokio = { version = "1", features = ["rt-multi-thread", "time"] }
+# rustls 0.23 resolves its provider from its OWN `ring` / `aws-lc-rs` features,
+# never from whichever crypto crates happen to be linked in the graph. Arti
+# pulls rustls in through `tor-rtcompat` with `default-features = false`, so
+# without this line rustls compiles with zero providers and the first TLS config
+# built from the process default fails at runtime — the "Failed to start /
+# Could not automatically determine the process-level CryptoProvider" screen.
+#
+# `ring`, not `aws-lc-rs`: aws-lc-rs needs CMake and a C toolchain for the NDK
+# and fights the Android cross-compile. The `ring` crate was already in the
+# graph (via `snow`, for Noise) but that is a different thing entirely.
+rustls = { version = "0.23", default-features = false, features = ["ring"] }
 uniffi = { version = "0.32", features = ["cli", "tokio"] }
 thiserror = "2"
 

crates/onionwire-sdk/src/lib.rs

@@ -17,13 +17,38 @@
 //! no TUI/ratatui type leaks into the AAR.
 
 use std::path::PathBuf;
-use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::sync::{Arc, OnceLock};
 
 use onionwire::node::Node;
 use onionwire::qr;
 
 uniffi::setup_scaffolding!();
 
+/// Install rustls's process-level default `CryptoProvider`, exactly once.
+///
+/// Belt and braces. `Cargo.toml` pins `rustls` with the `ring` feature, which
+/// is what actually fixes the missing-provider failure: with it, rustls
+/// resolves a provider from crate features on its own. This function exists
+/// because the cdylib is loaded into a process we do not own — an explicitly
+/// installed provider makes the SDK independent of how the surrounding app's
+/// feature graph happens to resolve rustls.
+///
+/// Idempotent and cheap after the first call (`OnceLock` short-circuits it).
+/// An `Err` means some provider is already installed process-wide, which is the
+/// outcome we want, so it is deliberately ignored — including the case of a
+/// consumer that installed `aws-lc-rs` itself. A genuine *conflict* — both
+/// provider features compiled in — is a build-graph bug, not something to
+/// paper over here; `Cargo.toml` enables `ring` only.
+///
+/// Not exported over UniFFI: it is Rust-side plumbing, not part of the Kotlin
+/// surface.
+pub fn install_crypto_provider() {
+    static INSTALLED: OnceLock<()> = OnceLock::new();
+    INSTALLED.get_or_init(|| {
+        let _ = rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().install_default();
+    });
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, uniffi::Error)]
 #[uniffi(flat_error)]
 pub enum WireError {
@@ -88,6 +113,10 @@ pub struct Wire {
 /// that is minutes, not seconds. Call it off the main thread.
 #[uniffi::export(async_runtime = "tokio")]
 pub async fn open_wire(home: String, passphrase: String) -> WResult<Arc<Wire>> {
+    // Before anything that can build a TLS config: Arti's rustls backend dies
+    // with "Could not automatically determine the process-level CryptoProvider"
+    // if no provider is resolvable. See `install_crypto_provider`.
+    install_crypto_provider();
     let node = Node::start_with_passphrase(PathBuf::from(home), &passphrase)
         .await
         .map_err(WireError::new)?;

crates/onionwire-sdk/tests/init_provider.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+//! `open_wire` must not depend on how the consumer's feature graph resolves a
+//! rustls provider — it installs the process default itself, first.
+//!
+//! This is the belt-and-braces half of the fix for the on-device "Failed to
+//! start / Could not automatically determine the process-level CryptoProvider"
+//! screen; the primary fix is the `rustls` `ring` feature in `Cargo.toml`,
+//! covered by `tests/provider_resolution.rs`. Kept in its own test binary on
+//! purpose: installing a provider here would mask that test if they shared a
+//! process.
+
+#[test]
+fn sdk_installs_the_process_default_provider() {
+    assert!(
+        rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider::get_default().is_none(),
+        "this test must start with no provider installed"
+    );
+
+    onionwire_sdk::install_crypto_provider();
+
+    assert!(
+        rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider::get_default().is_some(),
+        "install_crypto_provider() left the process without a default provider"
+    );
+
+    // Second call: idempotent, not a panic and not an error.
+    onionwire_sdk::install_crypto_provider();
+
+    // The call Arti makes that blew up on device.
+    let _ = rustls::ClientConfig::builder();
+}

crates/onionwire-sdk/tests/provider_resolution.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+//! Regression test for the on-device failure: the APK built, installed and
+//! opened, but pressing **Open** on the unlock screen died one call deep inside
+//! Arti's rustls backend with
+//!
+//! ```text
+//! Could not automatically determine the process-level CryptoProvider from
+//! Rustls crate features.
+//! Call CryptoProvider::install_default() before this point to select a
+//! provider manually, or make sure exactly one of the 'aws-lc-rs' and 'ring'
+//! features is enabled.
+//! ```
+//!
+//! rustls 0.23 chooses its provider from its own `ring` / `aws-lc-rs` **crate
+//! features**, not from which crypto crates happen to be linked. Arti reaches
+//! rustls through `tor-rtcompat` with `default-features = false`, so neither
+//! provider feature is on and rustls is compiled with *no* provider at all:
+//! `ring` showing up in `cargo tree` (pulled in by `snow`, for Noise) proves
+//! nothing. Everything compiles, the APK ships, and the process-default lookup
+//! fails at runtime.
+//!
+//! This test is the invariant Arti relies on: the process default must be
+//! resolvable **without** anyone calling `install_default()` first.
+//!
+//! Deliberately the only test in this file — a second test that installs a
+//! provider would race with it inside the same test binary and could mask the
+//! regression.
+
+/// Building a `rustls` config the way Arti does, straight from the process
+/// default, must not panic.
+#[test]
+fn rustls_default_provider_resolves_without_manual_install() {
+    assert!(
+        rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider::get_default().is_none(),
+        "this test must start with no provider installed"
+    );
+
+    // Pre-fix this panics with the device's exact message.
+    let _ = rustls::ClientConfig::builder();
+
+    assert!(
+        rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider::get_default().is_some(),
+        "rustls resolved no CryptoProvider — the crate feature that selects a \
+         provider is not enabled in this workspace"
+    );
+}

docs/SECURITY_AUDIT.md

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+# OnionWire Security Audit
+Commit: 2b42864ebaaef2aab64e66055ee482c525180f63 (`2b42864`)
+Baseline: `cargo test --locked` **pass** (100 passed, 3 ignored), `cargo clippy --locked --all-targets -- -D warnings` **pass**
+Auditor: rust-dev (no access to running hidden services / live Monero wallet)
+Tree: worktree `wt/t_d85060fb` at `/home/lancelot/Projects/onionwire/.worktrees/t_d85060fb`
+Remote: `origin/main` = same SHA (`https://forgejo.siriusdevops.com/sirius/onionwire.git`)
+
+Ignored tests (`needs live Tor network`): `rotate_hs`, `tor_hs`, `two_node`. Not re-run.
+
+## Severity key
+Critical = remote key compromise or plaintext disclosure
+High     = local key/plaintext disclosure, authn bypass, or payment forgery
+Medium   = DoS, nonce/IV weakness, metadata leak
+Low      = hygiene, error-path leakage, docs mismatch
+Info     = observation
+
+## Findings
+
+### F1 — Incoming receipt `verified=1` on unrelated wallet history  [High]
+Location: `src/wallet.rs:142-148`, used at `src/node.rs:667-683`
+
+Evidence: confirmation is not “this txid paid this amount to this address”.
+
+```142:148:src/wallet.rs
+pub fn transfers_match(rows: &[TransferRow], txid: &str, amount: &str, address: &str) -> bool {
+    rows.iter().any(|r| {
+        r.txid == txid
+            || (!address.is_empty()
+                && r.address == address
+                && (amount.is_empty() || r.amount == amount))
+    })
+}
+```
+
+`ingest_receipt` verifies the **ed25519** on the `rcp` frame (so the *friend* signed it), inserts `verified: false`, then flips `verified` if `transfers_match` is true (`src/node.rs:671-682`). Replica of that predicate against two wallet rows `{txid:aaa111, amount:1000, addr:4AAA…}` and `{txid:bbb222, amount:5, addr:8BBB…}`:
+
+```
+txid-only match (wrong amount+addr): True
+addr+amount match (wrong txid): True
+honest miss: False
+```
+
+Impact: a friend who completed Noise IK can send a signed receipt for an arbitrary amount/address and get the TUI line `[receipt] N XMR` (verified) if *either* (a) `txid` appears anywhere in `get_transfers` `in`/`pending`, or (b) some inbound row already has that address and amount. That is payment forgery against the local “verified” bit. It is not a third-party wire injection: the frame still has to decrypt under the pinned session. `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md:33` says “Never trust a `rcp` frame without RPC confirmation (`verified` stays 0)” — the code *does* promote `verified`, and the RPC check does not bind amount+address+txid together. Tests encode the store default (`tests/pay.rs` `incoming_receipt_is_not_verified`) but never exercise `transfers_match` against mismatched amount.
+
+Fix: require `txid == row.txid && amount == row.amount && address == row.address` (and reject empty fields). Do not OR. Keep `verified=0` if RPC is down.
+
+### F2 — Chat AEAD has empty AAD; ciphertext rows are interchangeable  [Medium]
+Location: `src/backup.rs:98-108` (`aead_encrypt`), `src/store.rs:649` / `670`
+
+Evidence: bodies are `nonce || ChaCha20-Poly1305(key, nonce, pt)` with no associated data. The same 32-byte `msg_key` wraps every row. A DB writer who cannot open the passphrase can still swap `messages.plaintext` blobs. Throwaway against this tree (`/tmp/ow-audit-repro`, `CARGO_TARGET_DIR` = this worktree `target`):
+
+```
+SWAP: alice sees "secret-for-bob"
+SWAP: bob sees "secret-for-alice"
+```
+
+Both `list_messages` calls returned `Ok`; Poly1305 verified. `dir` / `friend_id` / `id` / `created_at` are plaintext columns and are not in the MAC.
+
+Impact: anyone with write access to `onionwire.db` (same uid, stolen unlocked file, or a bug that writes sqlite) can reattribute ciphertext across friends and in/out without the passphrase. This is *not* remote plaintext disclosure. Identity secret keys are already plaintext in `self` (threat model says so); this is extra: the body encryption does not bind a row to its owner. Nonces are 96-bit random per `generate_nonce` — reuse across restarts/`wipe-all` (new key) / first-unlock rewrap is not the failure mode here.
+
+Fix: encrypt as `Aead::encrypt` with AAD = `friend_id || dir || row_id` (or a committed header), or include those fields in the plaintext that is MACed. Reject decrypt if AAD does not match the row.
+
+### F3 — Invite `sig` is over concatenated strings, not length-prefixed fields  [Medium]
+Location: `src/qr.rs:67-72` (`sign_msg`), `src/qr.rs:36-64` (`decode`)
+
+Evidence: `sig` covers `k.as_bytes() || onion.as_bytes() || spk.as_bytes()` with no delimiters or lengths. `k` is 64 hex chars after the 32-byte check, so it cannot shift. `o` and `spk` can. Encode a real v3 onion + 32-byte `spk`, then move the first 8 hex chars of `spk` onto `o`, keep `k` and `sig`. `qr::decode` **accepts** the mutant:
+
+```
+CONCAT: mutated invite accepted
+CONCAT: onion_changed=true
+CONCAT: onion=abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567.onionabababab
+CONCAT: spk_len=28 (want 32)
+CONCAT: pubkey_unchanged=true
+```
+
+`decode` does not require `signed_prekey.len()==32` or a v3 onion. `Node::add_friend_payload` then `upsert_friend` (same `k` **replaces** locator) and `set_friend_prekey`. Duplicate/unknown fields are rejected (`src/qr.rs:85-106`); all four fields are required. Empty `sig` fails `from_hex`. This is not a classic steal-the-identity concat: `k` stays the signer.
+
+Impact: a mutated invite still verifies under the real identity key. F3-paste (or a same-`k` rescan) can poison `friends.onion` / `prekey` for that pubkey. The shifted onion is not an arbitrary attacker HS (you can only append a hex prefix of the original `spk`), so this is roster integrity / availability, not a silent MITM. Handshake then fails (`prekey` length ≠ 32 at `node.rs:388`). No panic on this path. `from_hex` has **no size cap**: a 4,000,000-char hex string decoded to 2,000,000 bytes in 0.34s in CPython; `decode` allocates that before `pubkey.len()!=32` rejects.
+
+Fix: sign a domain-separated encoding (`k` || `0x00` || `o` || `0x00` || `spk`, or length prefixes). Reject `spk` ≠ 32 bytes and onion ≠ v3. Cap invite length before `from_hex` (a few KiB).
+
+### F4 — Monero address check is prefix+length, not checksum  [Medium]
+Location: `src/pay.rs:38-48`; tests *require* the junk form to pass (`tests/pay.rs:15-50`)
+
+Evidence:
+
+```38:48:src/pay.rs
+pub fn check_address(addr: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    let ok = match addr.as_bytes().first() {
+        Some(b'4') if addr.len() == 95 || addr.len() == 106 => true,
+        Some(b'8') if addr.len() == 95 => true,
+        _ => false,
+    };
+    if ok && !addr.contains('\n') {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(Error("invalid Monero address".into()))
+    }
+}
+```
+
+`4` + `'A' * 94` is accepted (len 95). No network byte, no Keccak checksum, no alphabet check. `profile::check_fields` (`src/profile.rs:118-128`) does not call `check_address` at all — `xmr_addr` may be `"4abc"` (`tests/profile.rs`). `/tip` does call `check_address` on the stored profile address (`src/node.rs:331`). `/pay` invoices are signed over that address (`src/node.rs:290`).
+
+Impact: OnionWire will persist and sign invoices/receipts for strings no Monero wallet should pay. A live `monero-wallet-rpc` will usually reject checksum failures on `transfer`, so this is not by itself silent theft. It *is* a local fail-open: garbage becomes a signed `inv`/`rcp` payload and a payments row. Combined with F1, a verified receipt can cite such an address.
+
+Fix: decode base58, check network prefix + checksum. Empty profile `xmr_addr` stays allowed; non-empty must pass the same check.
+
+### F5 — Wallet RPC is unauthenticated HTTP and can mark receipts from its full transfer list  [Medium]
+Location: `src/wallet.rs:151-171`, `223-237`, `117-138`; README documents `ONIONWIRE_WALLET_RPC=http://127.0.0.1:18083`
+
+Evidence: URL parser requires `http://` (no TLS), host must be loopback or `.onion` (`allowed_host`, tested in `tests/wallet.rs` `refuse_non_loopback_non_onion_host`). There is no `user:pass` / Digest / header. `http_post` is raw `TcpStream` + `read_to_end` with a 5s timeout, no body size cap. `.onion` hosts are allowed but `TcpStream::connect((onion, port))` does **not** go through Arti — so an onion RPC URL fail-closes at connect (not examined live). `eprintln!("ONIONWIRE_WALLET_RPC: {e}")` prints the parse error, not the URL, on bad env.
+
+Impact: the documented operator setup is “HTTP to loopback, no login”. Any local process that can reach that port can `transfer` (spend) and `get_transfers` (the same list F1 trusts). OnionWire never holds spend keys (threat model — true); it also never authenticates to the process that does. This is local, not remote, if the operator actually bound loopback. Code cannot express `--rpc-login`.
+
+Fix: require digest (or a unix socket). Refuse URLs without credentials. Cap RPC read size. If onion RPC is a goal, dial it through the Arti client, not `TcpStream`.
+
+### F6 — `/wipe` does not touch payments; sqlite is not `secure_delete`  [Low]
+Location: `src/store.rs:677-685`, `122-125`
+
+Evidence: `wipe_messages` overwrites `messages.plaintext` with `zeroblob(length)`, `DELETE FROM messages`, `VACUUM`. No `PRAGMA secure_delete`. No `DELETE FROM payments`. WAL is required (`journal_mode = WAL` fail-closed). Threat model (`docs/THREAT_MODEL.md:21`) says “`/wipe` overwrites message bodies and vacuums” — that part matches. It does not say payments go away; they do not. Identity / friend pubkeys / onions stay plaintext (disclosed, not a finding). `onionwire.db` itself is never `chmod 0600`; the home and `arti/` dirs are `0700` after `create_dir_all` (`src/store.rs:753-758`, `tests/store.rs:61-62`). Backup files *are* `0o600` at create (`src/node.rs:145-150`).
+
+Impact: `/wipe` is not a forensic erase (SSD wear-leveling, WAL snapshots, payments table, roster). A seized disk after `/wipe` still has who you pay and who you talk to. `/wipe-all` is `remove_dir_all` — same disk caveat.
+
+Fix: if `/wipe` should mean “chat history gone”, also drop `payments` (and checkpoint WAL). Document that `/wipe` is not crypto-shred. Optional `secure_delete` is still not a guarantee on flash.
+
+### F7 — HS publish logs the onion; `dangerously_trust_everyone` is Arti-only  [Low]
+Location: `src/hs.rs:31-36`, `src/hs.rs:95`, `src/node.rs:95`
+
+Evidence: `wait_until_published(..., &onion, &onion)` uses the unredacted onion as `label`. `eprintln!("{label} hs status: {state:?}")` and probe lines go to stderr. `onion_string` uses `display_unredacted` (`src/hs.rs:70`) — required to persist the locator; the leak is the log. `client_config` calls `builder.storage().permissions().dangerously_trust_everyone()` after `create_dir_all` on the Arti state/cache paths. That API is fs-mistrust for **Arti’s** directories, not sqlite. `Store::open_at_with_passphrase` `mkdir_700`s `home` and `home/arti` first; `home/cache` is created by Arti’s `create_dir_all` without `0700`. `cbtmintimeout` / `cbtinitialtimeout` = 20s is a circuit-build floor (perf / publish reliability), not an auth bypass.
+
+Impact: journald/script logs contain the current v3 locator. Arti state/cache may be created `0755` until something else tightens them; sqlite lives under the `0700` home. A world-readable Arti cache is descriptor/consensus metadata, not chat bodies.
+
+Fix: log a redacted onion (safelog). `mkdir_700` the cache dir before `client_config`. Keep `dangerously_trust_everyone` scoped to Arti storage; do not reuse it for `onionwire.db`.
+
+### F8 — Threat model overstates receipt verification and omits F1–F3  [Low]
+Location: `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md:17-21`, `:33`, `:39-41`
+
+Evidence: TM correctly describes live-only send, loc rules, identity-vs-locator, passphrase-wrapped message key, plaintext identity/roster, experimental Arti, global 30/60s burst-10 token bucket, backup = identity. It claims RPC confirmation keeps `verified` at 0 unless the chain view agrees — F1 shows the matcher is not that. It does not mention empty AEAD AAD, invite concat, shape-only XMR addresses, or env passphrase (`ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE` in `src/store.rs:745-750`, visible in `/proc/<pid>/environ`).
+
+Impact: an operator who treats TM as the capability list will believe “verified receipt ⇒ wallet saw that payment”.
+
+Fix: either implement F1’s conjunctive match or change the sentence to “incoming `rcp` is displayed; `verified` is best-effort and must not be trusted in v0.2”.
+
+## Verified correct
+
+- Noise pattern is actually `Noise_IK_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s` with prologue `onionwire-v1` (`src/session.rs:8-9, 111-122`). Initiator sets `remote_public_key` to the QR/roster x25519 prekey (`src/session.rs:189`). Responder takes remote static from snow (`get_remote_static`) and looks up the friend (`src/session.rs:255-260`, `src/node.rs:550-555`).
+- Mutual identity proofs are `ed25519_sign(handshake_hash)` with the 32-byte pubkey prefix; `verify_proof` calls `VerifyingKey::verify` (`src/session.rs:289-310`). Initiator compares proof prefix to the **pinned** identity (`src/session.rs:219-222`); responder to the roster id (`src/session.rs:273-276`). Mismatch is `Error::mismatch` → send hard-fails (`src/node.rs:490`).
+- Transport nonces are snow `TransportState` counters (Noise spec: increment, reject reuse). Application code does not set ChaCha nonces on the wire. Session keys include ephemeral DH → compromise of long-term static does not decrypt **past** transport; it does allow impersonation **forward**. That is IK, not a bug.
+- Loc frames: `apply_loc` verifies ed25519 against the **session** `peer_identity`, requires the pubkey already in `friends`, and requires `ts > onion_updated_at` (`src/store.rs:452-480`, `src/loc.rs:38-55`, `src/node.rs:561-568`). A peer cannot silently move you to an onion they control unless they hold that identity key (Noise proof + loc sig). An old loc with smaller `ts` cannot rewind after a later rotate. (F3 invite paste can still overwrite locator; that is out-of-band.)
+- Unknown typed prefixes (`xyz `) are `Kind::Drop`, not fatal (`src/dispatch.rs:30-38`). Unparseable loc/inv/rcp are ignored (`src/node.rs:562`, `610-611`, `643-644`). Handshake/frame errors print `incoming: {e}` and the rend task ends; the accept loop continues (`src/node.rs:723-729`).
+- Frames are length-prefixed, `MAX_FRAME = 65535`, checked **before** allocating the body (`src/frame.rs:5, 63-67`).
+- Token bucket is **one global** `TokenBucket::default()` = 30 tokens / 60s, burst 10 (`src/ratelimit.rs:41-44`, `src/node.rs:86, 712-720`). Matches TM; one flood can starve every friend (availability, not auth).
+- Backup: Argon2id v0x13, `m=19456` KiB, `t=2`, `p=1` (`src/backup.rs:52-53`) = OWASP 2023 minimum. Per-export 16-byte salt + 12-byte random nonce in the file. `open` AEAD-fails with a single error before `replace_identity_keys` (`src/backup.rs:91-95`, `src/node.rs:155-168`). Onion is not in the blob (`tests/backup.rs`). Wrong passphrase does not write keys.
+- First-run message key: 32 random bytes, wrapped with the same KDF/AEAD, stored in `store_meta` (`src/store.rs:281-293`). Empty passphrase refused. Integrity check fail-closed (`src/store.rs:191-194`).
+- Amounts on the pay path are decimal **integer piconero** (`src/pay.rs:51-59`); `xmr_to_atomic` pads a ≤12-digit fraction without float (`src/pay.rs:62-85`). `/tip` then `parse`s to `u64` for RPC (`src/node.rs:332-334`).
+- Incoming `inv`/`rcp` are verified against **session peer identity**, not a field inside the frame (`src/node.rs:613`, `646`).
+- Locked product decisions (no server/XMPP/MAM/DHT, live-only send, identity=pubkey, onion=locator, no dual-host grace) match the code. Not findings.
+
+## Not examined / out of scope
+
+- Live hidden-service reachability, IPT/HsDir, and two-node Tor tests (ignored; no HS from this auditor).
+- Live `monero-wallet-rpc` (auth defaults, `get_transfers` JSON shape vs `json_amount`, unlock/spend confirm).
+- snow 0.10 internals beyond the `Builder`/`TransportState` API used here (constant-time, rekey at 2^64).
+- Arti keystore encryption at rest, fs-mistrust semantics of `dangerously_trust_everyone` beyond “it is called on Arti storage”.
+- Timing of Argon2 / ed25519 verify (failed backup passphrase is one error string; KDF still runs).
+- TUI rendering of hostile chat (ratatui text; no HTML).
+- Traffic analysis / HS existence (TM already declines that).
+- `cargo audit`: **not installed** (`which cargo-audit` empty). Lockfile inspected by hand; no RustSec lookup was executed against this `Cargo.lock`.
+
+## Dependencies (Cargo.lock)
+
+| Crate | Lock version | Cargo.toml |
+|---|---|---|
+| snow | 0.10.0 | `0.10` |
+| chacha20poly1305 | 0.10.1 | `0.10` |
+| argon2 | 0.5.3 | `0.5` |
+| ed25519-dalek | 2.2.0 | `2` |
+| x25519-dalek | 2.0.1 | `2` |
+| rusqlite | 0.36.0 | `0.36` (bundled) |
+| arti-client | 0.46.0 | `0.46` + `onion-service-client` + `onion-service-service` |
+| tor-hsservice | 0.46.0 | `0.46` |
+
+Caret reqs are not `=`; `cargo update` can move 0.10.x / 0.46.x without a Cargo.toml edit. `--locked` CI is the real pin. Arti onion services are still experimental upstream (TM + onionwire skill); this tree fail-closes, no C-tor fallback (`src/hs.rs:55`).
+
+## Open questions for Lance
+
+- Is a “verified” receipt allowed to mean anything in v0.2, or should the UI only ever show “unverified” until F1 is conjunctive and covered by a test?
+- Invite encoding: length-prefix / `0x00` separators now, or wait for `onionwire:v2` (v1 strings stay in the wild)?
+- Store passphrase: keep `ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE` (proc-visible) or prompt / kernel keyring?
+- Wallet RPC: document “loopback + `--rpc-login` you type into a wrapper”, or teach OnionWire digest?
+
+## Stop / go (auditor, not a ship decision)
+
+Go for **friends-only chat** under the written seizure model (identity keys plaintext; bodies encrypted; Tor relays are not a server). **Do not** treat `verified` receipts as money moved. **Do not** treat F3-paste of a string you did not copy yourself as an integrity-checked locator. No Critical remote key/plaintext bug found in this revision.

docs/THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ A signed `loc` frame (`onion`, `ts`, `sig`) rewrites a friend’s locator **only
 
 ## Message bodies are encrypted at rest; keys are not
 
-Chat bodies in sqlite are ChaCha20-Poly1305 (`nonce || ciphertext` in the `messages.plaintext` column). A random 32-byte data key is wrapped with Argon2id (same params as identity backup) from a non-empty passphrase. Salt + wrapped key live in `store_meta`. Unlock is fail-closed: wrong or empty passphrase does not open chat.
+Chat bodies in sqlite are ChaCha20-Poly1305 (`nonce || ciphertext` in the `messages.plaintext` column) with AAD `owmsg1 || friend_id_le64 || dir || 0x00 || row_id_le64`. Swapping ciphertext between rows fails closed. A random 32-byte data key is wrapped with Argon2id (same params as identity backup) from a non-empty passphrase. Salt + wrapped key live in `store_meta`. Unlock is fail-closed: wrong or empty passphrase does not open chat. Empty-AAD v0.2 blobs are rewrapped once on unlock; `list_messages` never falls back to empty AAD.
 
-Identity secret key, friend public keys, and locators remain plaintext in the same db. The message key is not wrapped with `identity_sk` (that key is already on disk). A seized laptop still yields who you talk to and your identity unless you add OS/FDE. sqlcipher is out of v1. `/wipe` overwrites message bodies and vacuums; `/wipe-all` deletes the data dir.
+Identity secret key, friend public keys, and locators remain plaintext in the same db. The message key is not wrapped with `identity_sk` (that key is already on disk). A seized laptop still yields who you talk to and your identity unless you add OS/FDE. sqlcipher is out of v1. `/wipe` deletes chat and payments history (overwrite message bodies, `VACUUM`, WAL checkpoint); roster and identity stay. It is not a forensic erase — SSD wear-leveling can keep copies. `/wipe-all` deletes the data dir (new identity); same disk caveat.
 
 ## Fail closed
 
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ A signed `prf` frame is shown to people who already have a session with you. App
 
 ## Monero sidecar is not a wallet
 
-OnionWire never holds spend keys. Optional `ONIONWIRE_WALLET_RPC` talks HTTP to a user-hosted `monero-wallet-rpc`. Never trust a `rcp` frame without RPC confirmation (`verified` stays 0). Subaddress reuse is the user’s wallet policy.
+OnionWire never holds spend keys. Optional `ONIONWIRE_WALLET_RPC` talks HTTP Digest to a user-hosted `monero-wallet-rpc` on loopback (`--rpc-login` required; open RPC is refused). A Noise friend can sign any `rcp`; the signature proves who sent the claim, not that a payment happened. `verified=1` only after a conjunctive RPC match: one `get_transfers` row with the same non-empty `txid`, `amount`, and `address`. Incoming `rcp` stays `verified=0` if RPC is down, errors, or no exact row. Subaddress reuse is the user’s wallet policy.
 
 ## Backup file is the identity
 

src/backup.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 //! Encrypted identity backup. Onion (locator) is not included.
 
 use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2, Params, Version};
-use chacha20poly1305::aead::{Aead, AeadCore, KeyInit, OsRng};
+use chacha20poly1305::aead::{Aead, AeadCore, KeyInit, OsRng, Payload};
 use chacha20poly1305::{ChaCha20Poly1305, Key, Nonce};
 use rand::RngCore;
 
@@ -95,11 +95,21 @@ pub fn open(passphrase: &str, blob: &[u8]) -> Result<BackupKeys, String> {
     BackupKeys::from_bytes(&pt)
 }
 
-pub(crate) fn aead_encrypt(key: &[u8; 32], plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
+pub(crate) fn aead_encrypt(
+    key: &[u8; 32],
+    plaintext: &[u8],
+    aad: &[u8],
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
     let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(Key::from_slice(key));
     let nonce = ChaCha20Poly1305::generate_nonce(&mut OsRng);
     let ct = cipher
-        .encrypt(&nonce, plaintext)
+        .encrypt(
+            &nonce,
+            Payload {
+                msg: plaintext,
+                aad,
+            },
+        )
         .map_err(|_| "encrypt failed".to_string())?;
     let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(NONCE_LEN + ct.len());
     out.extend_from_slice(&nonce);
@@ -107,13 +117,19 @@ pub(crate) fn aead_encrypt(key: &[u8; 32], plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>,
     Ok(out)
 }
 
-pub(crate) fn aead_decrypt(key: &[u8; 32], blob: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
+pub(crate) fn aead_decrypt(key: &[u8; 32], blob: &[u8], aad: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
     if blob.len() < NONCE_LEN + 16 {
         return Err("ciphertext length".into());
     }
     let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&blob[..NONCE_LEN]);
     let cipher = ChaCha20Poly1305::new(Key::from_slice(key));
     cipher
-        .decrypt(nonce, &blob[NONCE_LEN..])
+        .decrypt(
+            nonce,
+            Payload {
+                msg: &blob[NONCE_LEN..],
+                aad,
+            },
+        )
         .map_err(|_| "wrong passphrase or corrupt".to_string())
 }

src/dispatch.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ pub enum Kind {
     Invoice,
     Receipt,
     Ping,
+    File,
     Drop,
 }
 
@@ -27,6 +28,9 @@ pub fn classify(pt: &[u8]) -> Kind {
     if pt.starts_with(b"png ") {
         return Kind::Ping;
     }
+    if pt.starts_with(b"fil ") {
+        return Kind::File;
+    }
     if pt.len() >= 4
         && pt[0].is_ascii_lowercase()
         && pt[1].is_ascii_lowercase()

src/file.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+//! Fail-closed file frames. One file = N one-shot `fil ` payloads.
+
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::fs::{self, OpenOptions};
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+use std::os::unix::fs::{OpenOptionsExt, PermissionsExt};
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+use rand::RngCore;
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+
+use crate::frame;
+
+pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct Error(String);
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for Error {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        self.0.fmt(f)
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for Error {}
+
+impl From<std::io::Error> for Error {
+    fn from(e: std::io::Error) -> Self {
+        Self(e.to_string())
+    }
+}
+
+pub const MAX_BYTES: usize = 1024 * 1024;
+const PREFIX: &[u8] = b"fil ";
+const NOISE_TAG: usize = 16;
+const NAME_MAX: usize = 128;
+const XFER_LEN: usize = 16;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct Chunk {
+    pub xfer_id: [u8; XFER_LEN],
+    pub filename: String,
+    pub sha256: [u8; 32],
+    pub idx: u32,
+    pub total: u32,
+    pub data: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+struct Inflight {
+    filename: String,
+    sha256: [u8; 32],
+    total: u32,
+    next: u32,
+    written: usize,
+}
+
+pub struct Inbox {
+    root: PathBuf,
+    // ponytail: no timeout janitor. A vanished peer leaves .partial-* until
+    // a later bad chunk for that xfer_id or process exit. Size is still capped.
+    inflight: HashMap<[u8; XFER_LEN], Inflight>,
+}
+
+pub fn safe_name(name: &str) -> Result<&str> {
+    if name.is_empty() || name.len() > NAME_MAX {
+        return Err(Error("bad file name".into()));
+    }
+    if name.contains('\0')
+        || name.contains('/')
+        || name.contains('\n')
+        || name == ".."
+        || name == "."
+    {
+        return Err(Error("bad file name".into()));
+    }
+    if Path::new(name).file_name().and_then(|s| s.to_str()) != Some(name) {
+        return Err(Error("bad file name".into()));
+    }
+    Ok(name)
+}
+
+fn safe_fp(fp: &str) -> bool {
+    !fp.is_empty() && fp.len() <= 64 && fp.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
+}
+
+pub fn read_limited(path: &Path) -> Result<(String, Vec<u8>)> {
+    let meta = fs::metadata(path)?;
+    if meta.len() > MAX_BYTES as u64 {
+        return Err(Error("file larger than 1 MiB".into()));
+    }
+    let name = path
+        .file_name()
+        .and_then(|s| s.to_str())
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error("bad file name".into()))?
+        .to_string();
+    safe_name(&name)?;
+    let bytes = fs::read(path)?;
+    if bytes.len() > MAX_BYTES {
+        return Err(Error("file larger than 1 MiB".into()));
+    }
+    Ok((name, bytes))
+}
+
+pub fn chunks(filename: &str, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<Chunk>> {
+    safe_name(filename)?;
+    if bytes.len() > MAX_BYTES {
+        return Err(Error("file larger than 1 MiB".into()));
+    }
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    hasher.update(bytes);
+    let sha256: [u8; 32] = hasher.finalize().into();
+    let mut xfer_id = [0u8; XFER_LEN];
+    rand::rngs::OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut xfer_id);
+
+    let total = total_chunks(filename, bytes.len())?;
+    let cap = data_cap(filename, total);
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(total as usize);
+    for idx in 0..total {
+        let start = (idx as usize).saturating_mul(cap);
+        let end = (start + cap).min(bytes.len());
+        out.push(Chunk {
+            xfer_id,
+            filename: filename.to_string(),
+            sha256,
+            idx,
+            total,
+            data: bytes[start..end].to_vec(),
+        });
+    }
+    Ok(out)
+}
+
+pub fn encode(chunk: &Chunk) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut out = Vec::from(PREFIX);
+    out.extend_from_slice(to_hex(&chunk.xfer_id).as_bytes());
+    out.push(b'\n');
+    out.extend_from_slice(chunk.filename.as_bytes());
+    out.push(b'\n');
+    out.extend_from_slice(to_hex(&chunk.sha256).as_bytes());
+    out.push(b'\n');
+    out.extend_from_slice(chunk.idx.to_string().as_bytes());
+    out.push(b'/');
+    out.extend_from_slice(chunk.total.to_string().as_bytes());
+    out.push(b'\n');
+    out.extend_from_slice(&chunk.data);
+    out
+}
+
+pub fn decode(pt: &[u8]) -> Option<Chunk> {
+    let rest = pt.strip_prefix(PREFIX)?;
+    let mut parts = rest.splitn(5, |&b| b == b'\n');
+    let xfer_hex = std::str::from_utf8(parts.next()?).ok()?;
+    let filename = std::str::from_utf8(parts.next()?).ok()?;
+    let sha_hex = std::str::from_utf8(parts.next()?).ok()?;
+    let idx_total = std::str::from_utf8(parts.next()?).ok()?;
+    let data = parts.next()?.to_vec();
+    safe_name(filename).ok()?;
+    let xfer_id: [u8; XFER_LEN] = from_hex(xfer_hex)?.try_into().ok()?;
+    let sha256: [u8; 32] = from_hex(sha_hex)?.try_into().ok()?;
+    let (idx_s, total_s) = idx_total.split_once('/')?;
+    let idx: u32 = idx_s.parse().ok()?;
+    let total: u32 = total_s.parse().ok()?;
+    if total == 0 || idx >= total {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(Chunk {
+        xfer_id,
+        filename: filename.to_string(),
+        sha256,
+        idx,
+        total,
+        data,
+    })
+}
+
+pub fn chat_line(name: &str, nbytes: usize) -> String {
+    format!("[file] {name} ({nbytes} bytes)")
+}
+
+impl Inbox {
+    pub fn new(root: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            root: root.into(),
+            inflight: HashMap::new(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn ingest(&mut self, peer_fp: &str, chunk: &Chunk) -> Result<Option<PathBuf>> {
+        if safe_name(&chunk.filename).is_err() {
+            return Err(Error("bad file name".into()));
+        }
+        if chunk.total == 0 || chunk.idx >= chunk.total {
+            return Err(Error("bad chunk index".into()));
+        }
+        if !safe_fp(peer_fp) {
+            return Err(Error("bad fingerprint".into()));
+        }
+        if chunk.data.len() > MAX_BYTES {
+            return Err(Error("file larger than 1 MiB".into()));
+        }
+        let partial = self.partial_path(&chunk.xfer_id);
+
+        if chunk.idx == 0 {
+            self.drop_partial(&chunk.xfer_id);
+            if let Err(e) = (|| {
+                ensure_dir(&self.root)?;
+                write_partial(&partial, &chunk.data, false)
+            })() {
+                self.drop_partial(&chunk.xfer_id);
+                return Err(e);
+            }
+            self.inflight.insert(
+                chunk.xfer_id,
+                Inflight {
+                    filename: chunk.filename.clone(),
+                    sha256: chunk.sha256,
+                    total: chunk.total,
+                    next: 1,
+                    written: chunk.data.len(),
+                },
+            );
+        } else {
+            let ok = self.inflight.get(&chunk.xfer_id).is_some_and(|st| {
+                st.filename == chunk.filename
+                    && st.sha256 == chunk.sha256
+                    && st.total == chunk.total
+                    && st.next == chunk.idx
+            });
+            if !ok {
+                self.drop_partial(&chunk.xfer_id);
+                return Err(Error("chunk mismatch".into()));
+            }
+            let next_len = self
+                .inflight
+                .get(&chunk.xfer_id)
+                .map(|st| st.written.saturating_add(chunk.data.len()))
+                .unwrap_or(usize::MAX);
+            if next_len > MAX_BYTES {
+                self.drop_partial(&chunk.xfer_id);
+                return Err(Error("file larger than 1 MiB".into()));
+            }
+            if let Err(e) = write_partial(&partial, &chunk.data, true) {
+                self.drop_partial(&chunk.xfer_id);
+                return Err(e);
+            }
+            if let Some(st) = self.inflight.get_mut(&chunk.xfer_id) {
+                st.next = chunk.idx + 1;
+                st.written = next_len;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if chunk.idx + 1 != chunk.total {
+            return Ok(None);
+        }
+
+        let finish = (|| {
+            let hashed = hash_file(&partial)?;
+            if hashed != chunk.sha256 {
+                return Err(Error("hash mismatch".into()));
+            }
+            let dest_dir = self.root.join(peer_fp);
+            ensure_dir(&dest_dir)?;
+            let dest = unique_path(&dest_dir, &chunk.filename)?;
+            fs::rename(&partial, &dest)?;
+            chmod(&dest, 0o600);
+            Ok(dest)
+        })();
+        match finish {
+            Ok(dest) => {
+                self.inflight.remove(&chunk.xfer_id);
+                Ok(Some(dest))
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                self.drop_partial(&chunk.xfer_id);
+                Err(e)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn partial_path(&self, xfer_id: &[u8; XFER_LEN]) -> PathBuf {
+        self.root.join(format!(".partial-{}", to_hex(xfer_id)))
+    }
+
+    fn drop_partial(&mut self, xfer_id: &[u8; XFER_LEN]) {
+        self.inflight.remove(xfer_id);
+        let _ = fs::remove_file(self.partial_path(xfer_id));
+    }
+}
+
+fn total_chunks(filename: &str, len: usize) -> Result<u32> {
+    if len == 0 {
+        return Ok(1);
+    }
+    let mut total = 1u32;
+    loop {
+        let cap = data_cap(filename, total);
+        if cap == 0 {
+            return Err(Error("file name too long for a frame".into()));
+        }
+        let need = u32::try_from(len.div_ceil(cap)).map_err(|_| Error("too many chunks".into()))?;
+        if need <= total {
+            return Ok(need.max(1));
+        }
+        total = need;
+    }
+}
+
+fn data_cap(filename: &str, total: u32) -> usize {
+    let digits = total.to_string().len().max(1);
+    let header =
+        PREFIX.len() + XFER_LEN * 2 + 1 + filename.len() + 1 + 64 + 1 + digits + 1 + digits + 1;
+    frame::MAX_FRAME
+        .saturating_sub(NOISE_TAG)
+        .saturating_sub(header)
+}
+
+fn write_partial(path: &Path, data: &[u8], append: bool) -> Result<()> {
+    let mut opts = OpenOptions::new();
+    opts.write(true).mode(0o600);
+    if append {
+        opts.append(true);
+    } else {
+        opts.create(true).truncate(true);
+    }
+    let mut f = opts.open(path)?;
+    f.write_all(data)?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn hash_file(path: &Path) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
+    let mut f = fs::File::open(path)?;
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    let mut buf = [0u8; 8192];
+    loop {
+        let n = f.read(&mut buf)?;
+        if n == 0 {
+            break;
+        }
+        hasher.update(&buf[..n]);
+    }
+    Ok(hasher.finalize().into())
+}
+
+fn unique_path(dir: &Path, name: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    let first = dir.join(name);
+    if !first.exists() {
+        return Ok(first);
+    }
+    for n in 2..1000 {
+        let p = dir.join(format!("{name}-{n}"));
+        if !p.exists() {
+            return Ok(p);
+        }
+    }
+    Err(Error("name collision".into()))
+}
+
+fn ensure_dir(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    fs::create_dir_all(path)?;
+    chmod(path, 0o700);
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn chmod(path: &Path, mode: u32) {
+    if let Ok(meta) = fs::metadata(path) {
+        let mut p = meta.permissions();
+        p.set_mode(mode);
+        let _ = fs::set_permissions(path, p);
+    }
+}
+
+fn to_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
+    bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect()
+}
+
+fn from_hex(s: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    if s.is_empty() || !s.len().is_multiple_of(2) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    if !s.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    (0..s.len())
+        .step_by(2)
+        .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&s[i..i + 2], 16).ok())
+        .collect()
+}

src/hs.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 //! In-process Arti onion-service helpers (no C-tor).
 
+use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
@@ -8,7 +9,7 @@ use arti_client::{TorClient, TorClientConfig};
 use futures::StreamExt;
 use safelog::DisplayRedacted;
 use tor_hsservice::status::State;
-use tor_hsservice::{HsNickname, OnionServiceConfig, RunningOnionService};
+use tor_hsservice::{HsId, HsNickname, OnionServiceConfig, RunningOnionService};
 use tor_rtcompat::PreferredRuntime;
 
 pub const HS_PORT: u16 = 80;
@@ -28,9 +29,24 @@ const PROBE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(12);
 
 pub type Client = Arc<TorClient<PreferredRuntime>>;
 
+fn mkdir_700(path: &std::path::Path) {
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(path).expect("mkdir");
+    let mut perms = std::fs::metadata(path).expect("metadata").permissions();
+    perms.set_mode(0o700);
+    std::fs::set_permissions(path, perms).expect("chmod 0700");
+}
+
+/// Status/probe log label: safelog-redacted v3 onion, never the locator.
+pub fn log_label(onion: &str) -> String {
+    match onion.parse::<HsId>() {
+        Ok(id) => id.display_redacted().to_string(),
+        Err(_) => safelog::sensitive(onion).to_string(),
+    }
+}
+
 pub fn client_config(state_dir: &std::path::Path, cache_dir: &std::path::Path) -> TorClientConfig {
-    std::fs::create_dir_all(state_dir).expect("state dir");
+    mkdir_700(state_dir);
-    std::fs::create_dir_all(cache_dir).expect("cache dir");
+    mkdir_700(cache_dir);
     let mut builder = TorClientConfigBuilder::from_directories(state_dir, cache_dir);
     builder.storage().permissions().dangerously_trust_everyone();
     builder
@@ -84,8 +100,8 @@ pub async fn wait_until_published(
     client: &Client,
     svc: &RunningOnionService,
     onion: &str,
-    label: &str,
 ) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let label = log_label(onion);
     let deadline = Instant::now() + PUBLISH_WAIT;
     let mut events = svc.status_events();
     let mut next_probe = Instant::now() + PROBE_EVERY;

src/lib.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 pub mod backup;
 pub mod dispatch;
+pub mod file;
 pub mod frame;
 pub mod hs;
 pub mod loc;
@@ -13,4 +14,7 @@ mod store;
 pub mod tui;
 pub mod wallet;
 
-pub use store::{Friend, FriendProfile, Message, Payment, PaymentWrite, SelfIdentity, Store};
+pub use store::{
+    Friend, FriendProfile, Message, Payment, PaymentWrite, SelfIdentity, Store,
+    resolve_store_passphrase,
+};

src/main.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 use onionwire::tui::AppExit;
-use std::io::{self, Write};
 
 fn print_help() {
     let v = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
@@ -35,7 +34,8 @@ async fn main() {
 
 async fn boot() -> Result<(), String> {
     let home = onionwire::Store::home_dir().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
-    let pass = store_passphrase()?;
+    let pass = onionwire::resolve_store_passphrase(|p| rpassword::prompt_password(p))
+        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
     eprintln!("onionwire: bootstrapping Arti…");
     let node = onionwire::node::Node::start_with_passphrase(home.clone(), &pass).await?;
     let handle = tokio::runtime::Handle::current();
@@ -48,22 +48,3 @@ async fn boot() -> Result<(), String> {
     }
     Ok(())
 }
-
-fn store_passphrase() -> Result<String, String> {
-    match std::env::var("ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE") {
-        Ok(p) if p.is_empty() => Err("empty passphrase".into()),
-        Ok(p) => Ok(p),
-        Err(_) => {
-            eprint!("onionwire: store passphrase: ");
-            let _ = io::stderr().flush();
-            let mut s = String::new();
-            io::stdin().read_line(&mut s).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
-            let s = s.trim_end_matches(['\n', '\r']).to_string();
-            if s.is_empty() {
-                Err("empty passphrase".into())
-            } else {
-                Ok(s)
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}

src/node.rs

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ use tor_cell::relaycell::msg::Connected;
 use tor_hsservice::{RunningOnionService, handle_rend_requests};
 
 use crate::dispatch::{self, Kind};
+use crate::file;
 use crate::frame;
 use crate::hs::{self, Client, HS_PORT};
 use crate::loc;
@@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ pub struct Node {
     keys: Mutex<Keys>,
     wallet: Wallet,
     incoming_limit: Mutex<TokenBucket>,
+    inbox: Mutex<file::Inbox>,
 }
 
 impl Node {
@@ -75,6 +77,7 @@ impl Node {
             .ok_or_else(|| "onion service disabled in config — fail closed".to_string())?;
         let (svc, rend) = launched;
         let onion = hs::onion_string(&svc)?;
+        let inbox = file::Inbox::new(home.join("inbox"));
         let node = Arc::new(Self {
             home,
             store: Mutex::new(store),
@@ -84,6 +87,7 @@ impl Node {
             keys: Mutex::new(keys),
             wallet: Wallet::from_env(),
             incoming_limit: Mutex::new(TokenBucket::default()),
+            inbox: Mutex::new(inbox),
         });
         // Accept rens before waiting so a reachability probe can succeed
         // while combined status is still Bootstrapping.
@@ -92,7 +96,7 @@ impl Node {
             _svc: Arc::clone(&svc),
             rend,
         });
-        hs::wait_until_published(&node.client, &svc, &onion, &onion).await?;
+        hs::wait_until_published(&node.client, &svc, &onion).await?;
         node.store
             .lock()
             .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
@@ -444,7 +448,7 @@ impl Node {
             _svc: Arc::clone(&svc),
             rend,
         });
-        hs::wait_until_published(&self.client, &svc, &onion, &onion).await?;
+        hs::wait_until_published(&self.client, &svc, &onion).await?;
         {
             let store = self.store.lock().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
             store.set_onion(&onion).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
@@ -481,6 +485,25 @@ impl Node {
         })
     }
 
+    /// One-shot file to a friend. Fail closed; no outbox, no resume.
+    pub async fn send_file(&self, friend_pk: &[u8], path: &Path) -> Result<String, String> {
+        let (name, bytes) = file::read_limited(path).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        let chunks = file::chunks(&name, &bytes).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        for chunk in &chunks {
+            self.send_once(friend_pk, &file::encode(chunk)).await?;
+        }
+        self.store
+            .lock()
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+            .append_message(
+                friend_pk,
+                "out",
+                file::chat_line(&name, bytes.len()).as_bytes(),
+            )
+            .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        Ok(name)
+    }
+
     pub async fn send(&self, friend_pk: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<(), String> {
         let (onion, prekey) = {
             let store = self.store.lock().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
@@ -620,10 +643,41 @@ impl Node {
             }
             Kind::Invoice => self.ingest_invoice(&sess.peer_identity, &pt).await,
             Kind::Receipt => self.ingest_receipt(&sess.peer_identity, &pt).await,
+            Kind::File => self.ingest_file(&sess.peer_identity, &pt),
             Kind::Ping | Kind::Drop => Ok(()),
         }
     }
 
+    fn ingest_file(&self, peer: &[u8], pt: &[u8]) -> Result<(), String> {
+        let Some(chunk) = file::decode(pt) else {
+            return Ok(());
+        };
+        let fp: String = peer.iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect();
+        let done = {
+            let mut inbox = self.inbox.lock().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+            match inbox.ingest(&fp, &chunk) {
+                Ok(p) => p,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    eprintln!("fil dropped ({e})");
+                    return Ok(());
+                }
+            }
+        };
+        if let Some(path) = done {
+            let nbytes = std::fs::metadata(&path).map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0) as usize;
+            let name = path
+                .file_name()
+                .and_then(|s| s.to_str())
+                .unwrap_or(&chunk.filename);
+            self.store
+                .lock()
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
+                .append_message(peer, "in", file::chat_line(name, nbytes).as_bytes())
+                .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
     async fn ingest_invoice(&self, peer: &[u8], pt: &[u8]) -> Result<(), String> {
         let Some(inv) = pay::decode_invoice(pt) else {
             return Ok(());

src/pay.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
+use sha3::{Digest, Keccak256};
 
 pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;
 
@@ -35,19 +36,72 @@ const INV_PREFIX: &[u8] = b"inv ";
 const RCP_PREFIX: &[u8] = b"rcp ";
 const PICONERO: u128 = 1_000_000_000_000;
 
+/// Bitcoin-style alphabet; Monero encodes 8-byte blocks (11 chars), not raw base58.
+const B58: &[u8] = b"123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+const B58_ENC_LEN: [usize; 9] = [0, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11];
+
 pub fn check_address(addr: &str) -> Result<()> {
-    let ok = match addr.as_bytes().first() {
+    let raw = decode_monero_b58(addr).ok_or_else(|| Error("invalid Monero address".into()))?;
-        Some(b'4') if addr.len() == 95 || addr.len() == 106 => true,
+    if raw.len() != 69 && raw.len() != 77 {
-        Some(b'8') if addr.len() == 95 => true,
+        return Err(Error("invalid Monero address".into()));
+    }
+    let (payload, ck) = raw.split_at(raw.len() - 4);
+    let hash = Keccak256::digest(payload);
+    if hash.as_slice().get(..4) != Some(ck) {
+        return Err(Error("invalid Monero address".into()));
+    }
+    let ok = match (payload[0], raw.len()) {
+        (18 | 24 | 42 | 36, 69) => true, // mainnet/stagenet standard + subaddress
+        (19 | 25, 77) => true,           // mainnet/stagenet integrated
         _ => false,
     };
-    if ok && !addr.contains('\n') {
+    if ok {
         Ok(())
     } else {
         Err(Error("invalid Monero address".into()))
     }
 }
 
+fn decode_monero_b58(addr: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    let bytes = addr.as_bytes();
+    if bytes.is_empty() || !bytes.iter().all(|b| B58.contains(b)) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    let mut i = 0;
+    while i < bytes.len() {
+        let rest = bytes.len() - i;
+        let (enc_len, dec_len) = if rest >= 11 {
+            (11, 8)
+        } else {
+            let dec_len = B58_ENC_LEN.iter().position(|&n| n == rest)?;
+            (rest, dec_len)
+        };
+        out.extend_from_slice(&decode_b58_block(&bytes[i..i + enc_len], dec_len)?);
+        i += enc_len;
+    }
+    Some(out)
+}
+
+fn decode_b58_block(enc: &[u8], out_len: usize) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    let mut acc: u128 = 0;
+    for &c in enc {
+        let d = B58.iter().position(|&a| a == c)? as u128;
+        acc = acc.checked_mul(58)?.checked_add(d)?;
+    }
+    let max = if out_len >= 16 {
+        return None;
+    } else if out_len == 0 {
+        0
+    } else {
+        (1u128 << (8 * out_len)) - 1
+    };
+    if acc > max {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(acc.to_be_bytes()[16 - out_len..].to_vec())
+}
+
 pub fn parse_atomic(s: &str) -> Result<u128> {
     if s.is_empty() || !s.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit()) {
         return Err(Error("amount must be decimal piconero".into()));

src/profile.rs

@@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ fn check_fields(display_name: &str, bio: &str, xmr_addr: &str) -> Result<()> {
     if display_name.contains('\n') || bio.contains('\n') || xmr_addr.contains('\n') {
         return Err(Error("profile fields must not contain newlines".into()));
     }
+    if !xmr_addr.is_empty() {
+        crate::pay::check_address(xmr_addr).map_err(|e| Error(e.to_string()))?;
+    }
     Ok(())
 }
 

src/qr.rs

@@ -20,30 +20,51 @@ pub struct QrPayload {
     pub signed_prekey: Vec<u8>,
 }
 
-/// `onionwire:v1:k={pubkey_hex}:o={v3onion}:spk={signed_prekey}:sig={sign(k||o||spk)}`
+/// Cap invite text before hex decode. Honest v1 is a few hundred bytes.
+const MAX_INVITE: usize = 4096;
+const HEX_K: usize = 64;
+const HEX_SPK: usize = 64;
+const HEX_SIG: usize = 128;
+
+/// `onionwire:v1:k={pubkey_hex}:o={v3onion}:spk={signed_prekey}:sig={sign(v2)}`
 pub fn encode(identity_sk: &[u8], onion: &str, signed_prekey: &[u8]) -> Result<String> {
+    if signed_prekey.len() != 32 {
+        return Err(Error("spk must be 32 bytes".into()));
+    }
+    if !is_v3_onion(onion) {
+        return Err(Error("o must be a v3 onion".into()));
+    }
     let sk_bytes: [u8; 32] = identity_sk
         .try_into()
         .map_err(|_| Error("identity secret key must be 32 bytes".into()))?;
     let sk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&sk_bytes);
     let k = to_hex(&sk.verifying_key().to_bytes());
     let spk = to_hex(signed_prekey);
-    let msg = sign_msg(&k, onion, &spk);
+    let msg = sign_msg_v2(&k, onion, &spk);
     let sig = to_hex(&sk.sign(&msg).to_bytes());
     Ok(format!("onionwire:v1:k={k}:o={onion}:spk={spk}:sig={sig}"))
 }
 
 pub fn decode(raw: &str) -> Result<QrPayload> {
+    if raw.len() > MAX_INVITE {
+        return Err(Error("invite too long".into()));
+    }
     let (k, onion, spk, sig) = parse_fields(raw)?;
+    if !is_hex_len(&k, HEX_K) {
+        return Err(Error("k must be 32 bytes".into()));
+    }
+    if !is_hex_len(&spk, HEX_SPK) {
+        return Err(Error("spk must be 32 bytes".into()));
+    }
+    if !is_hex_len(&sig, HEX_SIG) {
+        return Err(Error("sig must be 64 bytes".into()));
+    }
+    if !is_v3_onion(&onion) {
+        return Err(Error("o must be a v3 onion".into()));
+    }
     let pubkey = from_hex(&k)?;
     let signed_prekey = from_hex(&spk)?;
     let sig_bytes = from_hex(&sig)?;
-    if pubkey.len() != 32 {
-        return Err(Error("k must be 32 bytes".into()));
-    }
-    if sig_bytes.len() != 64 {
-        return Err(Error("sig must be 64 bytes".into()));
-    }
     let pk_arr: [u8; 32] = pubkey
         .as_slice()
         .try_into()
@@ -54,9 +75,15 @@ pub fn decode(raw: &str) -> Result<QrPayload> {
         .map_err(|_| Error("sig must be 64 bytes".into()))?;
     let vk = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pk_arr).map_err(|e| Error(e.to_string()))?;
     let signature = Signature::from_bytes(&sig_arr);
-    let msg = sign_msg(&k, &onion, &spk);
+    let ok_v2 = vk
-    vk.verify(&msg, &signature)
+        .verify(&sign_msg_v2(&k, &onion, &spk), &signature)
-        .map_err(|_| Error("bad signature".into()))?;
+        .is_ok();
+    let ok_v1 = vk
+        .verify(&sign_msg_v1(&k, &onion, &spk), &signature)
+        .is_ok();
+    if !ok_v2 && !ok_v1 {
+        return Err(Error("bad signature".into()));
+    }
     Ok(QrPayload {
         pubkey,
         onion,
@@ -64,7 +91,30 @@ pub fn decode(raw: &str) -> Result<QrPayload> {
     })
 }
 
-fn sign_msg(k: &str, onion: &str, spk: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
+fn is_v3_onion(s: &str) -> bool {
+    let Some(addr) = s.strip_suffix(".onion") else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    addr.len() == 56 && addr.bytes().all(|b| matches!(b, b'a'..=b'z' | b'2'..=b'7'))
+}
+
+fn is_hex_len(s: &str, n: usize) -> bool {
+    s.len() == n && s.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
+}
+
+fn sign_msg_v2(k: &str, onion: &str, spk: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut msg = Vec::with_capacity(19 + 3 + k.len() + onion.len() + spk.len());
+    msg.extend_from_slice(b"onionwire-invite-v1");
+    msg.push(0);
+    msg.extend_from_slice(k.as_bytes());
+    msg.push(0);
+    msg.extend_from_slice(onion.as_bytes());
+    msg.push(0);
+    msg.extend_from_slice(spk.as_bytes());
+    msg
+}
+
+fn sign_msg_v1(k: &str, onion: &str, spk: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
     let mut msg = Vec::with_capacity(k.len() + onion.len() + spk.len());
     msg.extend_from_slice(k.as_bytes());
     msg.extend_from_slice(onion.as_bytes());
@@ -118,7 +168,7 @@ fn to_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
 }
 
 fn from_hex(s: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
-    if s.is_empty() || !s.len().is_multiple_of(2) {
+    if s.len() > HEX_SIG || s.is_empty() || !s.len().is_multiple_of(2) {
         return Err(Error("invalid hex".into()));
     }
     if !s.bytes().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
@@ -129,3 +179,25 @@ fn from_hex(s: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
         .map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&s[i..i + 2], 16).map_err(|_| Error("invalid hex".into())))
         .collect()
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn v3() -> String {
+        format!("{}.onion", "a".repeat(56))
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn well_formed_v1_concat_still_decodes() {
+        let sk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
+        let k = to_hex(&sk.verifying_key().to_bytes());
+        let onion = v3();
+        let spk = to_hex(&[9u8; 32]);
+        let sig = to_hex(&sk.sign(&sign_msg_v1(&k, &onion, &spk)).to_bytes());
+        let raw = format!("onionwire:v1:k={k}:o={onion}:spk={spk}:sig={sig}");
+        let p = decode(&raw).expect("legacy concat");
+        assert_eq!(p.onion, onion);
+        assert_eq!(p.signed_prekey, vec![9u8; 32]);
+    }
+}

src/store.rs

@@ -117,12 +117,16 @@ impl Store {
         }
         mkdir_700(home)?;
         mkdir_700(&home.join("arti"))?;
+        mkdir_700(&home.join("cache"))?;
         let db_path = home.join("onionwire.db");
         let conn = Connection::open(&db_path)?;
         let journal: String = conn.query_row("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL", [], |row| row.get(0))?;
         if !journal.eq_ignore_ascii_case("wal") {
             return Err(Error(format!("journal_mode WAL failed: {journal}")));
         }
+        // Overwrite freed pages on DELETE. Flash wear-leveling can still keep copies;
+        // this is not a forensic / SSD crypto-shred.
+        conn.pragma_update(None, "secure_delete", "ON")?;
         conn.execute_batch(
             "
             PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
@@ -270,12 +274,13 @@ impl Store {
         match row {
             Some((salt, wrapped)) => {
                 let wrap_key = crate::backup::kdf(passphrase, &salt)?;
-                let raw = crate::backup::aead_decrypt(&wrap_key, &wrapped)
+                let raw = crate::backup::aead_decrypt(&wrap_key, &wrapped, b"")
                     .map_err(|_| Error("wrong passphrase".into()))?;
                 if raw.len() != 32 {
                     return Err(Error("wrapped message key length".into()));
                 }
                 self.msg_key.copy_from_slice(&raw);
+                self.rewrap_empty_aad_messages()?;
                 Ok(())
             }
             None => {
@@ -284,7 +289,7 @@ impl Store {
                 let mut salt = [0u8; 16];
                 OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut salt);
                 let wrap_key = crate::backup::kdf(passphrase, &salt)?;
-                let wrapped = crate::backup::aead_encrypt(&wrap_key, &data_key)?;
+                let wrapped = crate::backup::aead_encrypt(&wrap_key, &data_key, b"")?;
                 self.conn.execute(
                     "INSERT INTO store_meta (id, kdf_salt, wrapped_key) VALUES (1, ?1, ?2)",
                     params![salt.as_slice(), wrapped],
@@ -297,17 +302,59 @@ impl Store {
     }
 
     fn reencrypt_legacy_messages(&self) -> Result<()> {
-        let mut stmt = self.conn.prepare("SELECT id, plaintext FROM messages")?;
+        let mut stmt = self
-        let rows: Vec<(i64, Vec<u8>)> = stmt
+            .conn
-            .query_map([], |row| Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?)))?
+            .prepare("SELECT id, friend_id, dir, plaintext FROM messages")?;
+        let rows: Vec<(i64, i64, String, Vec<u8>)> = stmt
+            .query_map([], |row| {
+                Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?, row.get(2)?, row.get(3)?))
+            })?
             .collect::<std::result::Result<_, _>>()?;
         drop(stmt);
         if rows.is_empty() {
             return Ok(());
         }
         let tx = self.conn.unchecked_transaction()?;
-        for (id, plain) in rows {
+        for (id, friend_id, dir, plain) in rows {
-            let blob = crate::backup::aead_encrypt(&self.msg_key, &plain)?;
+            let aad = message_aad(friend_id, &dir, id);
+            let blob = crate::backup::aead_encrypt(&self.msg_key, &plain, &aad)?;
+            tx.execute(
+                "UPDATE messages SET plaintext = ?1 WHERE id = ?2",
+                params![blob, id],
+            )?;
+        }
+        tx.commit()?;
+        let _ = self.conn.execute_batch("PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)");
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// One-shot: empty-AAD v0.2 blobs → row-bound AAD. list_messages never falls back.
+    fn rewrap_empty_aad_messages(&self) -> Result<()> {
+        let mut stmt = self
+            .conn
+            .prepare("SELECT id, friend_id, dir, plaintext FROM messages")?;
+        let rows: Vec<(i64, i64, String, Vec<u8>)> = stmt
+            .query_map([], |row| {
+                Ok((row.get(0)?, row.get(1)?, row.get(2)?, row.get(3)?))
+            })?
+            .collect::<std::result::Result<_, _>>()?;
+        drop(stmt);
+        let mut updates = Vec::new();
+        for (id, friend_id, dir, blob) in rows {
+            let aad = message_aad(friend_id, &dir, id);
+            if crate::backup::aead_decrypt(&self.msg_key, &blob, &aad).is_ok() {
+                continue;
+            }
+            if let Ok(pt) = crate::backup::aead_decrypt(&self.msg_key, &blob, b"") {
+                let new_blob = crate::backup::aead_encrypt(&self.msg_key, &pt, &aad)?;
+                updates.push((id, new_blob));
+            }
+        }
+        if updates.is_empty() {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        let tx = self.conn.unchecked_transaction()?;
+        for (id, blob) in updates {
             tx.execute(
                 "UPDATE messages SET plaintext = ?1 WHERE id = ?2",
                 params![blob, id],
@@ -663,42 +710,59 @@ impl Store {
                 |row| row.get(0),
             )
             .map_err(|_| Error("friend not found".into()))?;
-        let blob = crate::backup::aead_encrypt(&self.msg_key, plaintext)?;
+        let tx = self.conn.unchecked_transaction()?;
-        self.conn.execute(
+        tx.execute(
-            "INSERT INTO messages (friend_id, dir, plaintext, created_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4)",
+            "INSERT INTO messages (friend_id, dir, plaintext, created_at) VALUES (?1, ?2, x'', ?3)",
-            params![friend_id, dir, blob, unix_now()],
+            params![friend_id, dir, unix_now()],
         )?;
+        let row_id = tx.last_insert_rowid();
+        let aad = message_aad(friend_id, dir, row_id);
+        let blob = crate::backup::aead_encrypt(&self.msg_key, plaintext, &aad)?;
+        tx.execute(
+            "UPDATE messages SET plaintext = ?1 WHERE id = ?2",
+            params![blob, row_id],
+        )?;
+        tx.commit()?;
         Ok(())
     }
 
     pub fn list_messages(&self, friend_pk: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<Message>> {
         let mut stmt = self.conn.prepare(
-            "SELECT m.dir, m.plaintext FROM messages m
+            "SELECT m.id, m.friend_id, m.dir, m.plaintext FROM messages m
              JOIN friends f ON f.id = m.friend_id
              WHERE f.pubkey = ?1
              ORDER BY m.id",
         )?;
         let rows = stmt.query_map(params![friend_pk], |row| {
-            Ok((row.get::<_, String>(0)?, row.get::<_, Vec<u8>>(1)?))
+            Ok((
+                row.get::<_, i64>(0)?,
+                row.get::<_, i64>(1)?,
+                row.get::<_, String>(2)?,
+                row.get::<_, Vec<u8>>(3)?,
+            ))
         })?;
         let mut out = Vec::new();
         for row in rows {
-            let (dir, blob) = row?;
+            let (id, friend_id, dir, blob) = row?;
-            let plaintext = crate::backup::aead_decrypt(&self.msg_key, &blob)
+            let aad = message_aad(friend_id, &dir, id);
+            let plaintext = crate::backup::aead_decrypt(&self.msg_key, &blob, &aad)
                 .map_err(|_| Error("message decrypt failed".into()))?;
             out.push(Message { dir, plaintext });
         }
         Ok(out)
     }
 
-    /// Overwrite message bodies, delete rows, VACUUM. Identity + friends stay.
+    /// Drop chat + payments history. Identity + friends stay.
+    /// Not a forensic erase: SSD wear-leveling can keep copies.
     pub fn wipe_messages(&self) -> Result<()> {
         self.conn.execute(
             "UPDATE messages SET plaintext = zeroblob(length(plaintext))",
             [],
         )?;
         self.conn.execute("DELETE FROM messages", [])?;
+        self.conn.execute("DELETE FROM payments", [])?;
         self.conn.execute_batch("VACUUM")?;
+        self.conn.execute_batch("PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)")?;
         Ok(())
     }
 
@@ -767,6 +831,26 @@ fn passphrase_from_env() -> Result<String> {
     }
 }
 
+/// Env `ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE` if set (non-empty). Otherwise `read_secret`
+/// (TTY, no echo). Empty values fail closed.
+pub fn resolve_store_passphrase(
+    read_secret: impl FnOnce(&str) -> std::io::Result<String>,
+) -> Result<String> {
+    match std::env::var("ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE") {
+        Ok(p) if p.is_empty() => Err(Error("empty passphrase".into())),
+        Ok(p) => Ok(p),
+        Err(_) => {
+            let s = read_secret("onionwire: store passphrase: ")?;
+            let s = s.trim_end_matches(['\n', '\r']).to_string();
+            if s.is_empty() {
+                Err(Error("empty passphrase".into()))
+            } else {
+                Ok(s)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 fn mkdir_700(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
     fs::create_dir_all(path)?;
     let mut perms = fs::metadata(path)?.permissions();
@@ -775,6 +859,17 @@ fn mkdir_700(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// AAD: `owmsg1` || friend_id_le64 || dir || 0x00 || row_id_le64
+fn message_aad(friend_id: i64, dir: &str, row_id: i64) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut aad = Vec::with_capacity(6 + 8 + dir.len() + 1 + 8);
+    aad.extend_from_slice(b"owmsg1");
+    aad.extend_from_slice(&friend_id.to_le_bytes());
+    aad.extend_from_slice(dir.as_bytes());
+    aad.push(0);
+    aad.extend_from_slice(&row_id.to_le_bytes());
+    aad
+}
+
 fn unix_now() -> i64 {
     SystemTime::now()
         .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
@@ -790,6 +885,148 @@ fn fingerprint(pubkey: &[u8]) -> String {
 mod at_rest {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn swapped_ciphertext_does_not_show_other_friends_body() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let store = Store::open_at_with_passphrase(dir.path(), "aad-pass").unwrap();
+        let alice = [1u8; 32];
+        let bob = [2u8; 32];
+        store.upsert_friend(&alice, "a.onion", None).unwrap();
+        store.upsert_friend(&bob, "b.onion", None).unwrap();
+        store
+            .append_message(&alice, "out", b"secret-for-alice")
+            .unwrap();
+        store
+            .append_message(&bob, "out", b"secret-for-bob")
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let blobs: Vec<(i64, Vec<u8>)> = {
+            let mut stmt = store
+                .conn
+                .prepare("SELECT id, plaintext FROM messages ORDER BY id")
+                .unwrap();
+            stmt.query_map([], |r| Ok((r.get(0)?, r.get(1)?)))
+                .unwrap()
+                .collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<_>>>()
+                .unwrap()
+        };
+        assert_eq!(blobs.len(), 2);
+        store
+            .conn
+            .execute(
+                "UPDATE messages SET plaintext = ?1 WHERE id = ?2",
+                params![&blobs[1].1, blobs[0].0],
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        store
+            .conn
+            .execute(
+                "UPDATE messages SET plaintext = ?1 WHERE id = ?2",
+                params![&blobs[0].1, blobs[1].0],
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+
+        if let Ok(msgs) = store.list_messages(&alice) {
+            assert!(
+                msgs.iter()
+                    .all(|m| m.plaintext.as_slice() != b"secret-for-bob"),
+                "alice saw bob's body after ciphertext swap"
+            );
+        }
+        if let Ok(msgs) = store.list_messages(&bob) {
+            assert!(
+                msgs.iter()
+                    .all(|m| m.plaintext.as_slice() != b"secret-for-alice"),
+                "bob saw alice's body after ciphertext swap"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn empty_aad_rows_rewrap_on_unlock_then_swap_fails() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let store = Store::open_at_with_passphrase(dir.path(), "rewrap-pass").unwrap();
+        let alice = [1u8; 32];
+        let bob = [2u8; 32];
+        store.upsert_friend(&alice, "a.onion", None).unwrap();
+        store.upsert_friend(&bob, "b.onion", None).unwrap();
+        store
+            .append_message(&alice, "out", b"secret-for-alice")
+            .unwrap();
+        store
+            .append_message(&bob, "out", b"secret-for-bob")
+            .unwrap();
+        let ids: Vec<i64> = {
+            let mut stmt = store
+                .conn
+                .prepare("SELECT id FROM messages ORDER BY id")
+                .unwrap();
+            stmt.query_map([], |r| r.get(0))
+                .unwrap()
+                .collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<_>>>()
+                .unwrap()
+        };
+        let a_blob = crate::backup::aead_encrypt(&store.msg_key, b"secret-for-alice", b"").unwrap();
+        let b_blob = crate::backup::aead_encrypt(&store.msg_key, b"secret-for-bob", b"").unwrap();
+        store
+            .conn
+            .execute(
+                "UPDATE messages SET plaintext = ?1 WHERE id = ?2",
+                params![a_blob, ids[0]],
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        store
+            .conn
+            .execute(
+                "UPDATE messages SET plaintext = ?1 WHERE id = ?2",
+                params![b_blob, ids[1]],
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        drop(store);
+
+        let store = Store::open_at_with_passphrase(dir.path(), "rewrap-pass").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            store.list_messages(&alice).unwrap()[0].plaintext,
+            b"secret-for-alice"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            store.list_messages(&bob).unwrap()[0].plaintext,
+            b"secret-for-bob"
+        );
+
+        let blobs: Vec<(i64, Vec<u8>)> = {
+            let mut stmt = store
+                .conn
+                .prepare("SELECT id, plaintext FROM messages ORDER BY id")
+                .unwrap();
+            stmt.query_map([], |r| Ok((r.get(0)?, r.get(1)?)))
+                .unwrap()
+                .collect::<rusqlite::Result<Vec<_>>>()
+                .unwrap()
+        };
+        store
+            .conn
+            .execute(
+                "UPDATE messages SET plaintext = ?1 WHERE id = ?2",
+                params![&blobs[1].1, blobs[0].0],
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        store
+            .conn
+            .execute(
+                "UPDATE messages SET plaintext = ?1 WHERE id = ?2",
+                params![&blobs[0].1, blobs[1].0],
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        if let Ok(msgs) = store.list_messages(&alice) {
+            assert!(
+                msgs.iter()
+                    .all(|m| m.plaintext.as_slice() != b"secret-for-bob"),
+                "alice saw bob's body after post-rewrap swap"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn first_unlock_reencrypts_legacy_plaintext_rows() {
         let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();

src/tui.rs

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ OnionWire keys\n\
   1 / 2 / 3         focus roster / chat / composer\n\
   j k  or  Up Down  move or scroll focused pane\n\
   g / G             jump to top / bottom\n\
-  Enter             /wipe  /wipe-all  /profile  /who  /pay  /tip\n\
+  Enter             send chat to selected friend, or a /command\n\
   Esc               close overlay, go back, clear composer\n\
   F2                share invite\n\
   F3                paste invite\n\
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ OnionWire keys\n\
   /profile          edit name, bio, Monero address\n\
   /pay <xmr> [memo] invoice to receive\n\
   /tip <xmr> [memo] pay selected friend\n\
+  /file /path        send file to selected friend (1 MiB)\n\
   /backup /path     encrypted identity export\n\
   /restore /path    overwrite self keys\n\
   ?                 this help\n\
@@ -163,6 +164,29 @@ pub enum SlashCmd {
     Tip { atomic: String, memo: String },
     Backup { path: String },
     Restore { path: String },
+    File { path: String },
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ComposerAction {
+    Cmd(SlashCmd),
+    Send(String),
+    UnknownSlash(String),
+}
+
+/// Enter in the composer: slash command, chat send, or unknown `/cmd`.
+pub fn composer_enter(raw: &str) -> Option<ComposerAction> {
+    let s = raw.trim();
+    if s.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    if let Some(cmd) = parse_cmd(raw) {
+        return Some(ComposerAction::Cmd(cmd));
+    }
+    if s.starts_with('/') {
+        return Some(ComposerAction::UnknownSlash(s.to_string()));
+    }
+    Some(ComposerAction::Send(s.to_string()))
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -284,6 +308,11 @@ pub fn parse_cmd(raw: &str) -> Option<SlashCmd> {
     {
         return parse_path_cmd(rest).map(|path| SlashCmd::Restore { path });
     }
+    if let Some(rest) = s.strip_prefix("/file")
+        && (rest.is_empty() || rest.starts_with(char::is_whitespace))
+    {
+        return parse_path_cmd(rest).map(|path| SlashCmd::File { path });
+    }
     None
 }
 
@@ -318,8 +347,9 @@ pub fn parse_slash(raw: &str) -> Option<WipeKind> {
 pub fn wipe_screen_text(kind: WipeKind) -> &'static str {
     match kind {
         WipeKind::Messages => {
-            "Wipe message log?\n\
+            "Wipe chat and payments history?\n\
 Identity key and friends stay.\n\
+Not a forensic erase.\n\
 Type WIPE to confirm    Esc to cancel"
         }
         WipeKind::All => {
@@ -692,6 +722,8 @@ impl App {
         let mut open_profile = false;
         let mut pay_cmd = None;
         let mut tip_cmd = None;
+        let mut file_cmd = None;
+        let mut chat_send = None;
         match &mut self.screen {
             Screen::Main => match key.code {
                 KeyCode::Tab => self.focus = self.focus.next(),
@@ -717,8 +749,8 @@ impl App {
                         self.composer.pop();
                     }
                 }
-                KeyCode::Enter => match parse_cmd(&self.composer) {
+                KeyCode::Enter => match composer_enter(&self.composer) {
-                    Some(SlashCmd::Wipe(kind)) => {
+                    Some(ComposerAction::Cmd(SlashCmd::Wipe(kind))) => {
                         self.composer.clear();
                         let prompt = match kind {
                             WipeKind::Messages => WipePrompt::messages(),
@@ -726,23 +758,23 @@ impl App {
                         };
                         self.screen = Screen::Wipe { kind, prompt };
                     }
-                    Some(SlashCmd::Profile) => {
+                    Some(ComposerAction::Cmd(SlashCmd::Profile)) => {
                         self.composer.clear();
                         open_profile = true;
                     }
-                    Some(SlashCmd::Who) => {
+                    Some(ComposerAction::Cmd(SlashCmd::Who)) => {
                         self.composer.clear();
                         self.who_open = true;
                     }
-                    Some(SlashCmd::Pay { atomic, memo }) => {
+                    Some(ComposerAction::Cmd(SlashCmd::Pay { atomic, memo })) => {
                         self.composer.clear();
                         pay_cmd = Some((atomic, memo));
                     }
-                    Some(SlashCmd::Tip { atomic, memo }) => {
+                    Some(ComposerAction::Cmd(SlashCmd::Tip { atomic, memo })) => {
                         self.composer.clear();
                         tip_cmd = Some((atomic, memo));
                     }
-                    Some(SlashCmd::Backup { path }) => {
+                    Some(ComposerAction::Cmd(SlashCmd::Backup { path })) => {
                         self.composer.clear();
                         self.screen = Screen::ConfirmKeys {
                             kind: BackupKind::Backup,
@@ -750,7 +782,7 @@ impl App {
                             prompt: BackupPrompt::backup(),
                         };
                     }
-                    Some(SlashCmd::Restore { path }) => {
+                    Some(ComposerAction::Cmd(SlashCmd::Restore { path })) => {
                         self.composer.clear();
                         self.screen = Screen::ConfirmKeys {
                             kind: BackupKind::Restore,
@@ -758,6 +790,18 @@ impl App {
                             prompt: BackupPrompt::restore(),
                         };
                     }
+                    Some(ComposerAction::Cmd(SlashCmd::File { path })) => {
+                        self.composer.clear();
+                        file_cmd = Some(path);
+                    }
+                    Some(ComposerAction::Send(text)) => {
+                        self.composer.clear();
+                        chat_send = Some(text);
+                    }
+                    Some(ComposerAction::UnknownSlash(cmd)) => {
+                        self.composer.clear();
+                        self.status_note = Some(format!("unknown command {cmd}"));
+                    }
                     None => {}
                 },
                 KeyCode::Char(c) if !key.modifiers.contains(KeyModifiers::CONTROL) => {
@@ -911,6 +955,12 @@ impl App {
         if let Some((atomic, memo)) = tip_cmd {
             self.send_tip(&atomic, &memo)?;
         }
+        if let Some(path) = file_cmd {
+            self.send_file(&path)?;
+        }
+        if let Some(text) = chat_send {
+            self.send_chat(&text)?;
+        }
         Ok(None)
     }
 
@@ -1162,6 +1212,36 @@ impl App {
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    fn send_file(&mut self, path: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+        let Some(friend) = self.friends.get(self.selected) else {
+            self.status_note = Some("no friend selected".into());
+            return Ok(());
+        };
+        let pk = friend.pubkey.clone();
+        self.status_note = Some("sending".into());
+        match self
+            .rt
+            .block_on(self.node.send_file(&pk, std::path::Path::new(path)))
+        {
+            Ok(name) => self.status_note = Some(format!("sent file {name}")),
+            Err(e) => self.status_note = Some(format!("send failed: {e}")),
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn send_chat(&mut self, text: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+        let Some(friend) = self.friends.get(self.selected) else {
+            self.status_note = Some("no friend selected".into());
+            return Ok(());
+        };
+        let pk = friend.pubkey.clone();
+        match self.rt.block_on(self.node.send(&pk, text.as_bytes())) {
+            Ok(()) => self.status_note = Some("sent".into()),
+            Err(e) => self.status_note = Some(format!("send failed: {e}")),
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
     fn who_body(&self) -> String {
         let Some(friend) = self.friends.get(self.selected) else {
             return "no friend selected\n\nEsc closes".into();
@@ -1293,7 +1373,7 @@ impl App {
         f.render_widget(chat, panes[1]);
 
         let cmd = if self.composer.is_empty() {
-            "/wipe  /wipe-all  /profile  /who  /pay  /tip".to_string()
+            "/wipe  /wipe-all  /profile  /who  /pay  /tip  /file".to_string()
         } else {
             self.composer.clone()
         };

src/wallet.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 use std::time::Duration;
 
+use rand::RngCore;
 use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
 use tokio::net::TcpStream;
 
@@ -16,11 +17,25 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for Error {
 
 impl std::error::Error for Error {}
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone)]
 struct Endpoint {
     host: String,
     port: u16,
     path: String,
+    user: String,
+    pass: String,
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Debug for Endpoint {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        f.debug_struct("Endpoint")
+            .field("host", &self.host)
+            .field("port", &self.port)
+            .field("path", &self.path)
+            .field("user", &self.user)
+            .field("pass", &"<redacted>")
+            .finish()
+    }
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
@@ -44,20 +59,28 @@ impl Wallet {
 
     pub fn from_env() -> Self {
         match std::env::var("ONIONWIRE_WALLET_RPC") {
-            Ok(s) if !s.trim().is_empty() => match Self::from_url(s.trim()) {
+            Ok(s) if !s.trim().is_empty() => {
-                Ok(w) => w,
+                let login = std::env::var("ONIONWIRE_WALLET_RPC_LOGIN")
-                Err(e) => {
+                    .ok()
-                    eprintln!("ONIONWIRE_WALLET_RPC: {e}");
+                    .map(|v| v.trim().to_string())
-                    Self::disabled()
+                    .filter(|v| !v.is_empty());
+                match parse_http_url(s.trim(), login.as_deref()) {
+                    Ok(endpoint) => Self {
+                        endpoint: Some(endpoint),
+                    },
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        eprintln!("ONIONWIRE_WALLET_RPC: {e}");
+                        Self::disabled()
+                    }
                 }
-            },
+            }
             _ => Self::disabled(),
         }
     }
 
     pub fn from_url(url: &str) -> Result<Self> {
         Ok(Self {
-            endpoint: Some(parse_http_url(url)?),
+            endpoint: Some(parse_http_url(url, None)?),
         })
     }
 
@@ -126,35 +149,68 @@ impl Wallet {
             "params": params,
         })
         .to_string();
-        let host_hdr = host_header(&ep.host, ep.port);
+        let raw = post_timeout(ep, &build_req(ep, &body, None)).await?;
-        let req = format!(
+        let status = http_status(&raw).unwrap_or(0);
-            "POST {} HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {host_hdr}\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n{body}",
+        if status == 200 {
-            ep.path,
+            return Err(Error(
-            body.len()
+                "wallet RPC requires digest auth (open RPC refused)".into(),
-        );
+            ));
-        let raw = tokio::time::timeout(RPC_TIMEOUT, http_post(ep, req.as_bytes()))
+        }
-            .await
+        if status != 401 {
-            .map_err(|_| Error("wallet RPC timed out".into()))??;
+            return parse_json_rpc(&raw);
+        }
+        let challenge = www_authenticate(&raw).ok_or_else(|| {
+            Error("wallet RPC digest required (--rpc-login / HTTP Digest)".into())
+        })?;
+        if !challenge.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().starts_with("digest") {
+            return Err(Error(
+                "wallet RPC digest required (--rpc-login / HTTP Digest)".into(),
+            ));
+        }
+        let auth = digest_authorization(ep, &challenge)?;
+        let raw = post_timeout(ep, &build_req(ep, &body, Some(&auth))).await?;
         parse_json_rpc(&raw)
     }
 }
 
 pub fn transfers_match(rows: &[TransferRow], txid: &str, amount: &str, address: &str) -> bool {
-    rows.iter().any(|r| {
+    if txid.is_empty() || amount.is_empty() || address.is_empty() {
-        r.txid == txid
+        return false;
-            || (!address.is_empty()
+    }
-                && r.address == address
+    rows.iter()
-                && (amount.is_empty() || r.amount == amount))
+        .any(|r| r.txid == txid && r.amount == amount && r.address == address)
-    })
 }
 
-fn parse_http_url(url: &str) -> Result<Endpoint> {
+fn credentials_required() -> Error {
+    Error("wallet RPC requires credentials (user:pass in URL or ONIONWIRE_WALLET_RPC_LOGIN)".into())
+}
+
+fn parse_login(login: &str) -> Result<(String, String)> {
+    let (user, pass) = login.split_once(':').ok_or_else(credentials_required)?;
+    if user.is_empty() || pass.is_empty() {
+        return Err(credentials_required());
+    }
+    Ok((user.to_string(), pass.to_string()))
+}
+
+fn parse_http_url(url: &str, extra_login: Option<&str>) -> Result<Endpoint> {
     let rest = url
         .strip_prefix("http://")
         .ok_or_else(|| Error("wallet RPC must be http:// (no TLS)".into()))?;
     if rest.contains("://") {
         return Err(Error("wallet RPC must be http:// (no TLS)".into()));
     }
+    let (userinfo, rest) = match rest.rsplit_once('@') {
+        Some((ui, hostpart)) => (Some(ui), hostpart),
+        None => (None, rest),
+    };
+    let (user, pass) = match userinfo {
+        Some(ui) => parse_login(ui)?,
+        None => match extra_login {
+            Some(login) => parse_login(login)?,
+            None => return Err(credentials_required()),
+        },
+    };
     let (hostport, path) = match rest.split_once('/') {
         Some((hp, p)) => (hp, format!("/{p}")),
         None => (rest, "/json_rpc".into()),
@@ -165,10 +221,21 @@ fn parse_http_url(url: &str) -> Result<Endpoint> {
         path
     };
     let (host, port) = parse_hostport(hostport)?;
-    if !allowed_host(&host) {
+    if host.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().ends_with(".onion") {
-        return Err(Error("wallet RPC host must be loopback or .onion".into()));
+        return Err(Error(
+            "wallet RPC over .onion is not supported (loopback only; no Arti dial)".into(),
+        ));
     }
-    Ok(Endpoint { host, port, path })
+    if !allowed_host(&host) {
+        return Err(Error("wallet RPC host must be loopback".into()));
+    }
+    Ok(Endpoint {
+        host,
+        port,
+        path,
+        user,
+        pass,
+    })
 }
 
 fn parse_hostport(hostport: &str) -> Result<(String, u16)> {
@@ -201,9 +268,6 @@ fn parse_port(p: &str) -> Result<u16> {
 
 fn allowed_host(host: &str) -> bool {
     let h = host.trim();
-    if h.to_ascii_lowercase().ends_with(".onion") {
-        return true;
-    }
     if h.eq_ignore_ascii_case("localhost") {
         return true;
     }
@@ -220,6 +284,31 @@ fn host_header(host: &str, port: u16) -> String {
     }
 }
 
+const MAX_RPC_BYTES: usize = 1024 * 1024;
+
+async fn post_timeout(ep: &Endpoint, req: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    tokio::time::timeout(RPC_TIMEOUT, http_post(ep, req.as_bytes()))
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| Error("wallet RPC timed out".into()))?
+}
+
+fn build_req(ep: &Endpoint, body: &str, authorization: Option<&str>) -> String {
+    let host_hdr = host_header(&ep.host, ep.port);
+    let mut req = format!(
+        "POST {} HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {host_hdr}\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n",
+        ep.path,
+        body.len()
+    );
+    if let Some(auth) = authorization {
+        req.push_str("Authorization: ");
+        req.push_str(auth);
+        req.push_str("\r\n");
+    }
+    req.push_str("\r\n");
+    req.push_str(body);
+    req
+}
+
 async fn http_post(ep: &Endpoint, req: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let mut stream = TcpStream::connect((ep.host.as_str(), ep.port))
         .await
@@ -229,13 +318,117 @@ async fn http_post(ep: &Endpoint, req: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
         .await
         .map_err(|e| Error(format!("wallet write: {e}")))?;
     let mut buf = Vec::new();
-    stream
+    let mut tmp = [0u8; 8192];
-        .read_to_end(&mut buf)
+    loop {
-        .await
+        let n = stream
-        .map_err(|e| Error(format!("wallet read: {e}")))?;
+            .read(&mut tmp)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| Error(format!("wallet read: {e}")))?;
+        if n == 0 {
+            break;
+        }
+        if buf.len().saturating_add(n) > MAX_RPC_BYTES {
+            return Err(Error("wallet RPC response too large".into()));
+        }
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&tmp[..n]);
+    }
     Ok(buf)
 }
 
+fn http_status(raw: &[u8]) -> Option<u16> {
+    let text = std::str::from_utf8(raw).ok()?;
+    let line = text.lines().next()?;
+    let mut parts = line.split_whitespace();
+    let _http = parts.next()?;
+    parts.next()?.parse().ok()
+}
+
+fn www_authenticate(raw: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
+    let text = std::str::from_utf8(raw).ok()?;
+    let (head, _) = text
+        .split_once("\r\n\r\n")
+        .or_else(|| text.split_once("\n\n"))?;
+    for line in head.lines().skip(1) {
+        let (k, v) = match line.split_once(':') {
+            Some(kv) => kv,
+            None => continue,
+        };
+        if k.eq_ignore_ascii_case("www-authenticate") {
+            return Some(v.trim().to_string());
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+fn digest_param(challenge: &str, key: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let t = challenge.trim();
+    let rest = if t.len() >= 6 && t[..6].eq_ignore_ascii_case("digest") {
+        t[6..].trim()
+    } else {
+        return None;
+    };
+    for part in rest.split(',') {
+        let part = part.trim();
+        let (k, v) = match part.split_once('=') {
+            Some(kv) => kv,
+            None => continue,
+        };
+        if k.eq_ignore_ascii_case(key) {
+            return Some(v.trim().trim_matches('"').to_string());
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+fn md5_hex(s: &str) -> String {
+    use md5::{Digest, Md5};
+    hex_lower(&Md5::digest(s.as_bytes()))
+}
+
+fn hex_lower(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
+    const H: &[u8; 16] = b"0123456789abcdef";
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(bytes.len() * 2);
+    for &b in bytes {
+        out.push(H[(b >> 4) as usize] as char);
+        out.push(H[(b & 0xf) as usize] as char);
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+fn digest_authorization(ep: &Endpoint, challenge: &str) -> Result<String> {
+    if let Some(alg) = digest_param(challenge, "algorithm")
+        && !alg.eq_ignore_ascii_case("MD5")
+    {
+        return Err(Error("wallet RPC digest algorithm not MD5".into()));
+    }
+    let realm = digest_param(challenge, "realm").unwrap_or_default();
+    let nonce = digest_param(challenge, "nonce")
+        .ok_or_else(|| Error("wallet RPC digest required (--rpc-login / HTTP Digest)".into()))?;
+    let qop = digest_param(challenge, "qop");
+    let ha1 = md5_hex(&format!("{}:{realm}:{}", ep.user, ep.pass));
+    let ha2 = md5_hex(&format!("POST:{}", ep.path));
+    let (qop_part, resp) = if qop
+        .as_deref()
+        .is_some_and(|q| q.split(',').any(|x| x.trim() == "auth"))
+    {
+        let mut cnonce_bytes = [0u8; 8];
+        rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut cnonce_bytes);
+        let cnonce = hex_lower(&cnonce_bytes);
+        let nc = "00000001";
+        let response = md5_hex(&format!("{ha1}:{nonce}:{nc}:{cnonce}:auth:{ha2}"));
+        (
+            format!(", qop=auth, nc={nc}, cnonce=\"{cnonce}\""),
+            response,
+        )
+    } else {
+        (String::new(), md5_hex(&format!("{ha1}:{nonce}:{ha2}")))
+    };
+    Ok(format!(
+        "Digest username=\"{}\", realm=\"{realm}\", nonce=\"{nonce}\", uri=\"{}\", algorithm=MD5, response=\"{resp}\"{qop_part}",
+        ep.user, ep.path
+    ))
+}
+
 fn parse_json_rpc(raw: &[u8]) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
     let text = std::str::from_utf8(raw).map_err(|_| Error("wallet RPC not UTF-8".into()))?;
     let (head, body) = text

tests/file.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+//! M10: fail-closed file transfer — frames, names, assemble, slash parse.
+
+use onionwire::dispatch::{Kind, classify};
+use onionwire::file::{self, MAX_BYTES};
+use onionwire::tui::{SlashCmd, parse_cmd};
+
+#[test]
+fn encode_decode_roundtrip_one_chunk() {
+    let body = b"hello file";
+    let chunks = file::chunks("note.txt", body).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(chunks.len(), 1);
+    let encoded = file::encode(&chunks[0]);
+    let decoded = file::decode(&encoded).expect("decode");
+    assert_eq!(decoded.filename, "note.txt");
+    assert_eq!(decoded.idx, 0);
+    assert_eq!(decoded.total, 1);
+    assert_eq!(decoded.data, body);
+    assert_eq!(decoded.sha256, chunks[0].sha256);
+    assert_eq!(decoded.xfer_id, chunks[0].xfer_id);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn chat_is_not_file() {
+    assert_eq!(file::decode(b"hello wire"), None);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn name_with_dotdot_or_slash_rejected() {
+    assert!(file::chunks("../secret", b"x").is_err());
+    assert!(file::chunks("a/b", b"x").is_err());
+    assert!(file::safe_name("..").is_err());
+    assert!(file::safe_name("foo/bar").is_err());
+    assert!(file::safe_name("a\0b").is_err());
+    assert!(file::safe_name("ok.txt").is_ok());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn oversize_rejected_before_send() {
+    let too_big = vec![0u8; MAX_BYTES + 1];
+    assert!(file::chunks("big.bin", &too_big).is_err());
+    assert!(file::chunks("ok.bin", &vec![0u8; MAX_BYTES]).is_ok());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn assemble_two_chunks_writes_file_and_matches_hash() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let body = vec![7u8; 80_000];
+    let chunks = file::chunks("pic.bin", &body).unwrap();
+    assert!(chunks.len() >= 2, "expected split, got {}", chunks.len());
+    let mut inbox = file::Inbox::new(dir.path());
+    let fp = "aabbccddeeff";
+    let mut done = None;
+    for c in &chunks {
+        done = inbox.ingest(fp, c).unwrap();
+    }
+    let path = done.expect("assembled path");
+    assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&path).unwrap(), body);
+    assert!(path.ends_with("pic.bin"));
+    assert!(path.to_string_lossy().contains(fp));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn bad_hash_leaves_no_inbox_file() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let chunks = file::chunks("evil.bin", b"payload").unwrap();
+    let mut bad = chunks[0].clone();
+    bad.sha256 = [0u8; 32];
+    let mut inbox = file::Inbox::new(dir.path());
+    let fp = "deadbeef";
+    assert!(inbox.ingest(fp, &bad).is_err());
+    let dest = dir.path().join(fp).join("evil.bin");
+    assert!(!dest.exists(), "hash mismatch must not write inbox file");
+    let partials: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(dir.path())
+        .unwrap()
+        .filter_map(|e| e.ok())
+        .filter(|e| e.file_name().to_string_lossy().starts_with(".partial-"))
+        .collect();
+    assert!(
+        partials.is_empty(),
+        "partial must be deleted on hash mismatch"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn ingest_rejects_oversize_and_deletes_partial() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let mut inbox = file::Inbox::new(dir.path());
+    let mut chunk = file::chunks("fat.bin", b"x").unwrap().remove(0);
+    chunk.total = 2;
+    chunk.idx = 0;
+    chunk.data = vec![1u8; MAX_BYTES + 1];
+    assert!(inbox.ingest("aa", &chunk).is_err());
+    assert!(!dir.path().join("aa").join("fat.bin").exists());
+    let leftover: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(dir.path())
+        .unwrap()
+        .filter_map(|e| e.ok())
+        .filter(|e| e.file_name().to_string_lossy().starts_with(".partial-"))
+        .collect();
+    assert!(leftover.is_empty());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn ingest_rejects_cumulative_oversize() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let mut inbox = file::Inbox::new(dir.path());
+    let mut a = file::chunks("fat.bin", b"x").unwrap().remove(0);
+    a.total = 2;
+    a.idx = 0;
+    a.data = vec![1u8; MAX_BYTES - 10];
+    assert_eq!(inbox.ingest("aa", &a).unwrap(), None);
+    let mut b = a.clone();
+    b.idx = 1;
+    b.data = vec![1u8; 11];
+    assert!(inbox.ingest("aa", &b).is_err());
+    assert!(!dir.path().join("aa").join("fat.bin").exists());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn slash_file_parses_path_and_empty_is_none() {
+    assert_eq!(
+        parse_cmd("/file /tmp/a"),
+        Some(SlashCmd::File {
+            path: "/tmp/a".into()
+        })
+    );
+    assert_eq!(parse_cmd("/file"), None);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn dispatch_fil_is_file_not_chat() {
+    assert_eq!(classify(b"fil abc"), Kind::File);
+    assert_eq!(classify(b"hello wire"), Kind::Chat);
+}

tests/hs.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 //! HS publish wait and CBT floor — 180s fail-closed cuts a working HsDir upload.
 
+use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
 use std::time::Duration;
 
 use onionwire::hs;
@@ -67,3 +68,30 @@ fn broken_or_shutdown_never_ready() {
     assert!(!hs::hs_is_ready(State::Broken, true));
     assert!(!hs::hs_is_ready(State::Shutdown, true));
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn hs_log_label_is_not_the_full_v3_onion() {
+    // Public v3 address; checksum is valid so HsId::from_str works.
+    let onion = "facebookwkhpilnemxj7asaniu7vnjjbiltxjqhye3mhbshg7kx5tfyd.onion";
+    let label = hs::log_label(onion);
+    assert_ne!(label, onion, "status/probe logs must not use the locator");
+    assert!(
+        !label.contains("facebookwkhpilnemxj7asaniu7vnjjbiltxjqhye3mhbshg7kx5tfyd"),
+        "log label leaked the onion body: {label}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        label.contains('…') || label.contains("[scrubbed]"),
+        "expected safelog redaction, got {label}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn client_config_mkdirs_state_and_cache_0700() {
+    let root = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
+    let state = root.path().join("arti");
+    let cache = root.path().join("cache");
+    let _cfg = hs::client_config(&state, &cache);
+    let mode = |p: &std::path::Path| std::fs::metadata(p).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
+    assert_eq!(mode(&state), 0o700);
+    assert_eq!(mode(&cache), 0o700);
+}

tests/pay.rs

@@ -12,16 +12,20 @@ fn store() -> (tempfile::TempDir, Store) {
     (dir, store)
 }
 
+// Official mainnet standard from Monero docs (not live RPC).
+const MAINNET_STD: &str = "4AdUndXHHZ6cfufTMvppY6JwXNouMBzSkbLYfpAV5Usx3skxNgYeYTRj5UzqtReoS44qo9mtmXCqY45DJ852K5Jv2684Rge";
+// Same documented spend/view keys, mainnet subaddress (0x2A) and integrated (0x13 + 8 zero pid).
+const MAINNET_SUB: &str = "8BTd81B7syWcfufTMvppY6JwXNouMBzSkbLYfpAV5Usx3skxNgYeYTRj5UzqtReoS44qo9mtmXCqY45DJ852K5Jv25pnJx6";
+const MAINNET_INT: &str = "4LL9oSLmtpccfufTMvppY6JwXNouMBzSkbLYfpAV5Usx3skxNgYeYTRj5UzqtReoS44qo9mtmXCqY45DJ852K5Jv2WK48GNSUQf17NLRTG";
+// Same keys, stagenet standard (0x18).
+const STAGENET_STD: &str = "5AqWsUSEwACcfufTMvppY6JwXNouMBzSkbLYfpAV5Usx3skxNgYeYTRj5UzqtReoS44qo9mtmXCqY45DJ852K5Jv23X7tqA";
+
 fn addr_std() -> String {
-    format!("4{}", "A".repeat(94))
+    MAINNET_STD.to_string()
 }
 
 fn addr_sub() -> String {
-    format!("8{}", "B".repeat(94))
+    MAINNET_SUB.to_string()
-}
-
-fn addr_integrated() -> String {
-    format!("4{}", "C".repeat(105))
 }
 
 fn payw<'a>(
@@ -46,12 +50,20 @@ fn payw<'a>(
 
 #[test]
 fn valid_and_invalid_xmr_addresses() {
-    assert!(pay::check_address(&addr_std()).is_ok());
+    assert!(pay::check_address(MAINNET_STD).is_ok());
-    assert!(pay::check_address(&addr_sub()).is_ok());
+    assert!(pay::check_address(MAINNET_SUB).is_ok());
-    assert!(pay::check_address(&addr_integrated()).is_ok());
+    assert!(pay::check_address(MAINNET_INT).is_ok());
+    assert!(pay::check_address(STAGENET_STD).is_ok());
+    // prefix+length junk that the old checker accepted
+    assert!(pay::check_address(&format!("4{}", "A".repeat(94))).is_err());
+    assert!(pay::check_address(&format!("8{}", "B".repeat(94))).is_err());
+    assert!(pay::check_address(&format!("4{}", "C".repeat(105))).is_err());
     assert!(pay::check_address(&format!("4{}", "A".repeat(93))).is_err());
     assert!(pay::check_address(&format!("8{}", "B".repeat(95))).is_err());
-    assert!(pay::check_address(&format!("5{}", "A".repeat(94))).is_err());
+    assert!(pay::check_address(&format!("{MAINNET_STD}\n")).is_err());
+    let mut bad_ck = MAINNET_STD.to_string();
+    bad_ck.replace_range(94..95, "f");
+    assert!(pay::check_address(&bad_ck).is_err());
     assert!(pay::check_address("").is_err());
     assert!(pay::check_address("not-an-address").is_err());
 }

tests/profile.rs

@@ -108,21 +108,33 @@ fn chat_is_not_profile() {
     assert!(profile::decode(b"hello wire").is_none());
 }
 
+const MAINNET_STD: &str = "4AdUndXHHZ6cfufTMvppY6JwXNouMBzSkbLYfpAV5Usx3skxNgYeYTRj5UzqtReoS44qo9mtmXCqY45DJ852K5Jv2684Rge";
+
 #[test]
 fn self_profile_roundtrip() {
     let (_dir, store) = store();
-    store.set_self_profile("me", "a bio", "4abc").unwrap();
+    store.set_self_profile("me", "a bio", MAINNET_STD).unwrap();
     let got = store.self_profile().unwrap();
     assert_eq!(got.display_name, "me");
     assert_eq!(got.bio, "a bio");
-    assert_eq!(got.xmr_addr, "4abc");
+    assert_eq!(got.xmr_addr, MAINNET_STD);
     assert!(got.updated_at > 0);
     store.set_self_profile("", "", "").unwrap();
     let empty = store.self_profile().unwrap();
     assert_eq!(empty.display_name, "");
+    assert_eq!(empty.xmr_addr, "");
     assert!(empty.updated_at >= got.updated_at);
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn self_profile_rejects_short_xmr_addr() {
+    let (_dir, store) = store();
+    assert!(store.set_self_profile("me", "a bio", "4abc").is_err());
+    assert!(profile::validate("me", "a bio", "4abc").is_err());
+    assert!(profile::validate("me", "a bio", "").is_ok());
+    assert!(profile::validate("me", "a bio", MAINNET_STD).is_ok());
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn slash_profile_who_and_wipe_still_parse() {
     assert_eq!(parse_cmd("/profile"), Some(SlashCmd::Profile));

tests/qr.rs

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 
 use std::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard};
 
-use onionwire::Store;
 use onionwire::qr;
+use onionwire::Store;
 
 static ENV_LOCK: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
 
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ struct TempHome {
 impl TempHome {
     fn new() -> Self {
         let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
-        let guard = ENV_LOCK.lock().expect("env lock");
+        let guard = ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
         unsafe {
             std::env::set_var("ONIONWIRE_HOME", dir.path());
             std::env::set_var("ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE", "onionwire-test");
@@ -37,7 +37,37 @@ impl Drop for TempHome {
 }
 
 fn v3onion(tag: &str) -> String {
-    format!("{tag}.onion")
+    let mut addr = vec![b'a'; 56];
+    let bytes: Vec<u8> = tag
+        .bytes()
+        .map(|b| match b {
+            b'a'..=b'z' | b'2'..=b'7' => b,
+            _ => b'a',
+        })
+        .collect();
+    let n = bytes.len().min(56);
+    addr[..n].copy_from_slice(&bytes[..n]);
+    format!("{}.onion", String::from_utf8(addr).expect("base32"))
+}
+
+fn invite_fields(raw: &str) -> (String, String, String, String) {
+    let rest = raw.strip_prefix("onionwire:v1:").expect("prefix");
+    let mut k = String::new();
+    let mut o = String::new();
+    let mut spk = String::new();
+    let mut sig = String::new();
+    for part in rest.split(':') {
+        if let Some(v) = part.strip_prefix("k=") {
+            k = v.to_string();
+        } else if let Some(v) = part.strip_prefix("o=") {
+            o = v.to_string();
+        } else if let Some(v) = part.strip_prefix("spk=") {
+            spk = v.to_string();
+        } else if let Some(v) = part.strip_prefix("sig=") {
+            sig = v.to_string();
+        }
+    }
+    (k, o, spk, sig)
 }
 
 #[test]
@@ -119,3 +149,73 @@ fn unknown_k_decode_does_not_insert() {
     let _p = qr::decode(&raw).unwrap();
     assert_eq!(store.friend_count().unwrap(), 0);
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn shifted_o_spk_is_err() {
+    let _home = TempHome::new();
+    let store = Store::open().expect("open");
+    let me = store.self_identity().expect("self");
+    let onion = v3onion("honest");
+    let spk = [0xab; 32];
+    let raw = qr::encode(&me.identity_sk, &onion, &spk).expect("encode");
+    let (k, o, spk_hex, sig) = invite_fields(&raw);
+    assert_eq!(spk_hex.len(), 64);
+    let mutant = format!(
+        "onionwire:v1:k={k}:o={o}{}:spk={}:sig={sig}",
+        &spk_hex[..8],
+        &spk_hex[8..]
+    );
+    assert!(
+        qr::decode(&mutant).is_err(),
+        "shifted o/spk must not verify"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn encode_rejects_spk_not_32() {
+    let _home = TempHome::new();
+    let store = Store::open().expect("open");
+    let me = store.self_identity().expect("self");
+    let onion = v3onion("spk");
+    assert!(qr::encode(&me.identity_sk, &onion, &[1u8; 31]).is_err());
+    assert!(qr::encode(&me.identity_sk, &onion, &[1u8; 33]).is_err());
+    assert!(qr::encode(&me.identity_sk, &onion, &[]).is_err());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn encode_rejects_garbage_onion() {
+    let _home = TempHome::new();
+    let store = Store::open().expect("open");
+    let me = store.self_identity().expect("self");
+    let spk = [2u8; 32];
+    assert!(qr::encode(&me.identity_sk, "not-an-onion", &spk).is_err());
+    assert!(qr::encode(&me.identity_sk, "alice.onion", &spk).is_err());
+    assert!(qr::encode(&me.identity_sk, &format!("{}.onion", "A".repeat(56)), &spk).is_err());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn decode_rejects_spk_len_and_garbage_onion() {
+    let _home = TempHome::new();
+    let store = Store::open().expect("open");
+    let me = store.self_identity().expect("self");
+    let raw = qr::encode(&me.identity_sk, &v3onion("ok"), &[3u8; 32]).expect("encode");
+    let (k, o, spk, sig) = invite_fields(&raw);
+    let short_spk = format!("onionwire:v1:k={k}:o={o}:spk={}:sig={sig}", &spk[..62]);
+    assert!(qr::decode(&short_spk).is_err());
+    let garbage_o = format!("onionwire:v1:k={k}:o=nope.onion:spk={spk}:sig={sig}");
+    assert!(qr::decode(&garbage_o).is_err());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn huge_hex_is_err_quickly() {
+    let huge = format!(
+        "onionwire:v1:k={}:o=x:spk=yy:sig=zz",
+        "aa".repeat(1024 * 1024)
+    );
+    let t = std::time::Instant::now();
+    assert!(qr::decode(&huge).is_err());
+    assert!(
+        t.elapsed() < std::time::Duration::from_millis(250),
+        "decode must fail closed before a multi-MB alloc"
+    );
+}

tests/send.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+//! Composer Enter must send chat to the selected friend, not only slash commands.
+
+use onionwire::tui::{composer_enter, ComposerAction, SlashCmd, WipeKind};
+
+#[test]
+fn enter_plain_text_is_send() {
+    assert_eq!(
+        composer_enter("hello wire"),
+        Some(ComposerAction::Send("hello wire".into()))
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn enter_trims_but_sends() {
+    assert_eq!(
+        composer_enter("  hi there  "),
+        Some(ComposerAction::Send("hi there".into()))
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn enter_empty_does_nothing() {
+    assert_eq!(composer_enter(""), None);
+    assert_eq!(composer_enter("   "), None);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn enter_slash_cmds_are_not_chat() {
+    assert_eq!(
+        composer_enter("/wipe"),
+        Some(ComposerAction::Cmd(SlashCmd::Wipe(WipeKind::Messages)))
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        composer_enter("/who"),
+        Some(ComposerAction::Cmd(SlashCmd::Who))
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn enter_unknown_slash_is_not_chat() {
+    assert_eq!(
+        composer_enter("/nope"),
+        Some(ComposerAction::UnknownSlash("/nope".into()))
+    );
+}

tests/store.rs

@@ -55,11 +55,14 @@ fn first_run_creates_0700_dirs_and_self_row() {
     let store = Store::open().expect("open");
 
     let arti = home.path().join("arti");
+    let cache = home.path().join("cache");
     let db = home.path().join("onionwire.db");
     assert!(arti.is_dir(), "arti dir");
+    assert!(cache.is_dir(), "cache dir");
     assert!(db.is_file(), "onionwire.db");
     assert_eq!(mode(home.path()), 0o700);
     assert_eq!(mode(&arti), 0o700);
+    assert_eq!(mode(&cache), 0o700);
 
     let me = store.self_identity().expect("self");
     assert_eq!(me.identity_pk.len(), 32);
@@ -261,3 +264,64 @@ fn reopen_with_same_passphrase_decrypts() {
     let msgs = store.list_messages(&pk(1)).unwrap();
     assert_eq!(msgs[0].plaintext, b"hello again");
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn env_passphrase_skips_prompt() {
+    let _g = ENV_LOCK.lock().expect("env lock");
+    unsafe {
+        std::env::set_var("ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE", "from-env");
+    }
+    let mut prompted = false;
+    let got = onionwire::resolve_store_passphrase(|_| {
+        prompted = true;
+        Ok("from-tty".into())
+    });
+    unsafe {
+        std::env::remove_var("ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE");
+    }
+    assert_eq!(got.unwrap(), "from-env");
+    assert!(!prompted);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn empty_env_passphrase_is_rejected_without_prompt() {
+    let _g = ENV_LOCK.lock().expect("env lock");
+    unsafe {
+        std::env::set_var("ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE", "");
+    }
+    let mut prompted = false;
+    let err = onionwire::resolve_store_passphrase(|_| {
+        prompted = true;
+        Ok("from-tty".into())
+    })
+    .unwrap_err();
+    unsafe {
+        std::env::remove_var("ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE");
+    }
+    assert!(err.to_string().contains("empty"), "got {err}");
+    assert!(!prompted);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn missing_env_reads_secret_and_strips_newline() {
+    let _g = ENV_LOCK.lock().expect("env lock");
+    unsafe {
+        std::env::remove_var("ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE");
+    }
+    let got = onionwire::resolve_store_passphrase(|prompt| {
+        assert!(prompt.contains("store passphrase"), "prompt {prompt}");
+        Ok("secret-from-tty\n".into())
+    })
+    .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(got, "secret-from-tty");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn missing_env_empty_secret_is_rejected() {
+    let _g = ENV_LOCK.lock().expect("env lock");
+    unsafe {
+        std::env::remove_var("ONIONWIRE_STORE_PASSPHRASE");
+    }
+    let err = onionwire::resolve_store_passphrase(|_| Ok(String::new())).unwrap_err();
+    assert!(err.to_string().contains("empty"), "got {err}");
+}

tests/tor_hs.rs

@@ -124,10 +124,10 @@ async fn two_node_byte_pipe_restart_and_dormant() {
     eprintln!("bob onion={bob_onion}");
     assert_ne!(alice_onion, bob_onion, "separate HS identities");
 
-    hs::wait_until_published(&alice, &alice_svc, &alice_onion, "alice")
+    hs::wait_until_published(&alice, &alice_svc, &alice_onion)
         .await
         .expect("alice publish");
-    hs::wait_until_published(&bob, &bob_svc, &bob_onion, "bob")
+    hs::wait_until_published(&bob, &bob_svc, &bob_onion)
         .await
         .expect("bob publish");
 

tests/tui_chrome.rs

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 
 use onionwire::qr;
 use onionwire::tui::{
-    banner_for_width, compact_banner, draw_share, help_overlay_text, main_footer_hints,
+    Pane, banner_for_width, compact_banner, draw_share, help_overlay_text, main_footer_hints,
-    onion_glyph, status_footer, wordmark_banner, Pane,
+    onion_glyph, status_footer, wordmark_banner,
 };
 
 #[test]
@@ -40,7 +40,19 @@ fn help_overlay_lists_core_bindings() {
     let help = help_overlay_text();
     assert!(!help.is_empty());
     for needle in [
-        "Tab", "F2", "F3", "F4", "F5", "/profile", "/pay", "/tip", "/backup", "/restore", "Ctrl-Q",
+        "Tab",
+        "F2",
+        "F3",
+        "F4",
+        "F5",
+        "send chat",
+        "/profile",
+        "/pay",
+        "/tip",
+        "/file",
+        "/backup",
+        "/restore",
+        "Ctrl-Q",
         "?",
     ] {
         assert!(help.contains(needle), "help overlay missing {needle:?}");
@@ -65,13 +77,13 @@ fn banner_for_width_collapses_when_narrow() {
 
 #[test]
 fn chrome_renders_at_80x24_and_120x40() {
+    use ratatui::Terminal;
     use ratatui::backend::TestBackend;
     use ratatui::layout::{Constraint, Layout};
     use ratatui::widgets::Paragraph;
-    use ratatui::Terminal;
 
     let fp = "abcdef0123456789";
-    let onion = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567abcdefghijklmnopq.onion";
+    let onion = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx.onion";
     for (w, h) in [(80u16, 24u16), (120, 40)] {
         let backend = TestBackend::new(w, h);
         let mut terminal = Terminal::new(backend).expect("terminal");
@@ -113,7 +125,7 @@ fn chrome_renders_at_80x24_and_120x40() {
 #[test]
 fn main_footer_keeps_help_at_80_and_120() {
     let fp = "abcdef0123456789deadbeef";
-    let onion = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567abcdefghijklmnopq.onion";
+    let onion = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx.onion";
     let hints = main_footer_hints();
     assert!(hints.contains("? help"));
     for w in [80u16, 120] {
@@ -166,11 +178,11 @@ fn restore_terminal_is_callable_without_panic() {
 
 #[test]
 fn share_screen_shows_invite_not_qr_at_80x24() {
-    use ratatui::backend::TestBackend;
     use ratatui::Terminal;
+    use ratatui::backend::TestBackend;
 
     let sk = [7u8; 32];
-    let onion = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567abcdefghijklmnopq.onion";
+    let onion = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx.onion";
     let payload = qr::encode(&sk, onion, &[1u8; 32]).expect("encode");
     assert!(payload.starts_with("onionwire:v1:"));
 

tests/wallet.rs

@@ -1,9 +1,27 @@
 //! M8: optional monero-wallet-rpc JSON client. Mock TCP only — no live monerod.
 
-use onionwire::wallet::{self, Wallet};
+use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+use onionwire::pay;
+use onionwire::wallet::{self, TransferRow, Wallet};
+use onionwire::{PaymentWrite, Store};
+use rand::rngs::OsRng;
 use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
 use tokio::net::TcpListener;
 
+fn row(txid: &str, amount: &str, address: &str) -> TransferRow {
+    TransferRow {
+        txid: txid.into(),
+        amount: amount.into(),
+        address: address.into(),
+    }
+}
+
+fn xmr_addr() -> String {
+    // Same documented mainnet standard as tests/pay.rs — F4 checksums this.
+    "4AdUndXHHZ6cfufTMvppY6JwXNouMBzSkbLYfpAV5Usx3skxNgYeYTRj5UzqtReoS44qo9mtmXCqY45DJ852K5Jv2684Rge"
+        .to_string()
+}
+
 fn json_rpc_ok(result: &str) -> String {
     let body = format!(r#"{{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"0","result":{result}}}"#);
     format!(
@@ -12,13 +30,6 @@ fn json_rpc_ok(result: &str) -> String {
     )
 }
 
-async fn serve_once(listener: TcpListener, response: String) {
-    let (mut sock, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept");
-    let mut buf = vec![0u8; 4096];
-    let _ = sock.read(&mut buf).await;
-    sock.write_all(response.as_bytes()).await.expect("write");
-}
-
 #[test]
 fn disabled_create_address_is_not_configured() {
     let w = Wallet::disabled();
@@ -31,9 +42,19 @@ fn disabled_create_address_is_not_configured() {
     assert!(err.to_string().contains("not configured"), "got {err}");
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn refuse_url_without_credentials() {
+    let err = Wallet::from_url("http://127.0.0.1:18083").unwrap_err();
+    let msg = err.to_string().to_ascii_lowercase();
+    assert!(
+        msg.contains("credential") || msg.contains("login") || msg.contains("user"),
+        "got {err}"
+    );
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn refuse_non_loopback_non_onion_host() {
-    let err = Wallet::from_url("http://example.com:18083").unwrap_err();
+    let err = Wallet::from_url("http://ow:secret@example.com:18083").unwrap_err();
     assert!(
         err.to_string().to_ascii_lowercase().contains("host")
             || err.to_string().contains("loopback")
@@ -42,6 +63,34 @@ fn refuse_non_loopback_non_onion_host() {
     );
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn refuse_onion_rpc_url() {
+    let err = Wallet::from_url(
+        "http://ow:s3cretPASS@abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.onion:18083",
+    )
+    .unwrap_err();
+    let msg = err.to_string();
+    assert!(msg.to_ascii_lowercase().contains("onion"), "got {err}");
+    assert!(
+        !msg.contains("s3cretPASS"),
+        "password leaked in error: {err}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn password_absent_from_url_errors() {
+    let err = Wallet::from_url("http://ow:s3cretPASS@example.com:18083").unwrap_err();
+    assert!(
+        !err.to_string().contains("s3cretPASS"),
+        "password leaked in error: {err}"
+    );
+    let err = Wallet::from_url("http://ow:s3cretPASS@").unwrap_err();
+    assert!(
+        !err.to_string().contains("s3cretPASS"),
+        "password leaked in error: {err}"
+    );
+}
+
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn mock_get_address_parses_string() {
     let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
@@ -49,8 +98,8 @@ async fn mock_get_address_parses_string() {
     let canned = json_rpc_ok(
         r#"{"address":"4AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"}"#,
     );
-    tokio::spawn(serve_once(listener, canned));
+    tokio::spawn(serve_digest_then(listener, canned));
-    let w = Wallet::from_url(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}", addr.port())).unwrap();
+    let w = Wallet::from_url(&format!("http://ow:secret@127.0.0.1:{}", addr.port())).unwrap();
     let got = w.get_address().await.expect("get_address");
     assert!(got.starts_with('4'), "got {got}");
 }
@@ -62,15 +111,15 @@ async fn mock_create_address_and_transfer() {
     let canned = json_rpc_ok(
         r#"{"address":"8BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB","tx_hash":"abc123"}"#,
     );
-    tokio::spawn(serve_once(listener, canned.clone()));
+    tokio::spawn(serve_digest_then(listener, canned.clone()));
-    let w = Wallet::from_url(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}", addr.port())).unwrap();
+    let w = Wallet::from_url(&format!("http://ow:secret@127.0.0.1:{}", addr.port())).unwrap();
     let created = w.create_address().await.expect("create_address");
     assert!(created.starts_with('8'));
 
     let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
     let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
-    tokio::spawn(serve_once(listener, canned));
+    tokio::spawn(serve_digest_then(listener, canned));
-    let w = Wallet::from_url(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}", addr.port())).unwrap();
+    let w = Wallet::from_url(&format!("http://ow:secret@127.0.0.1:{}", addr.port())).unwrap();
     let txid = w
         .transfer("8BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB", 1)
         .await
@@ -85,8 +134,8 @@ async fn mock_get_transfers_matches_txid() {
     let canned = json_rpc_ok(
         r#"{"in":[{"txid":"deadbeef","amount":5,"address":"8BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"}],"pending":[]}"#,
     );
-    tokio::spawn(serve_once(listener, canned));
+    tokio::spawn(serve_digest_then(listener, canned));
-    let w = Wallet::from_url(&format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}", addr.port())).unwrap();
+    let w = Wallet::from_url(&format!("http://ow:secret@127.0.0.1:{}", addr.port())).unwrap();
     let rows = w.get_transfers().await.expect("get_transfers");
     assert!(wallet::transfers_match(
         &rows,
@@ -96,3 +145,135 @@ async fn mock_get_transfers_matches_txid() {
     ));
     assert!(!wallet::transfers_match(&rows, "nope", "1", "nope"));
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn transfers_match_txid_only_wrong_amount_or_addr_is_false() {
+    let addr = xmr_addr();
+    let rows = [row("deadbeef", "5", &addr)];
+    assert!(!wallet::transfers_match(&rows, "deadbeef", "99", &addr));
+    let other = format!("8{}", "C".repeat(94));
+    assert!(!wallet::transfers_match(&rows, "deadbeef", "5", &other));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn transfers_match_address_and_amount_wrong_txid_is_false() {
+    let addr = xmr_addr();
+    let rows = [row("deadbeef", "5", &addr)];
+    assert!(!wallet::transfers_match(&rows, "cafebabe", "5", &addr));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn transfers_match_honest_triple_is_true() {
+    let addr = xmr_addr();
+    let rows = [row("deadbeef", "5", &addr)];
+    assert!(wallet::transfers_match(&rows, "deadbeef", "5", &addr));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn transfers_match_empty_field_is_false() {
+    let addr = xmr_addr();
+    let rows = [row("deadbeef", "5", &addr)];
+    assert!(!wallet::transfers_match(&rows, "", "5", &addr));
+    assert!(!wallet::transfers_match(&rows, "deadbeef", "", &addr));
+    assert!(!wallet::transfers_match(&rows, "deadbeef", "5", ""));
+    let empty = [row("", "", "")];
+    assert!(!wallet::transfers_match(&empty, "", "", ""));
+}
+
+/// ingest_receipt inserts verified=0, then mark_verified iff transfers_match.
+/// A Noise-signed rcp that cites an unrelated wallet row must stay unverified.
+#[test]
+fn ingest_signed_receipt_mismatched_wallet_history_stays_unverified() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
+    let store = Store::open_at_with_passphrase(dir.path(), "onionwire-test").expect("open");
+    let sk = SigningKey::generate(&mut OsRng);
+    let pk = sk.verifying_key().to_bytes();
+    store.upsert_friend(&pk, "peer.onion", None).unwrap();
+    let addr = xmr_addr();
+    let rcp = pay::sign_receipt(&sk.to_bytes(), "unrelated", "5", &addr, 1).unwrap();
+    assert!(pay::verify_receipt(&pk, &rcp));
+    let id = store
+        .insert_payment(
+            &pk,
+            PaymentWrite {
+                dir: "in",
+                kind: "receipt",
+                amount_atomic: &rcp.amount_atomic,
+                address: &rcp.address,
+                memo: "",
+                txid: Some(&rcp.txid),
+                verified: false,
+            },
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+    let history = [row("unrelated", "99", &format!("8{}", "C".repeat(94)))];
+    if wallet::transfers_match(&history, &rcp.txid, &rcp.amount_atomic, &rcp.address) {
+        store.mark_verified(id).unwrap();
+    }
+    let rows = store.list_payments(&pk).unwrap();
+    assert!(!rows[0].verified);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn oversized_rpc_response_is_err() {
+    let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+    let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+    let huge = vec![b'A'; 2 * 1024 * 1024];
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        let (mut sock, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept");
+        let mut buf = vec![0u8; 4096];
+        let _ = sock.read(&mut buf).await;
+        sock.write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
+            .await
+            .expect("hdr");
+        sock.write_all(&huge).await.expect("body");
+    });
+    let w = Wallet::from_url(&format!("http://ow:secret@127.0.0.1:{}", addr.port())).unwrap();
+    let err = w.get_address().await.unwrap_err();
+    let msg = err.to_string().to_ascii_lowercase();
+    assert!(
+        msg.contains("large") || msg.contains("size") || msg.contains("cap"),
+        "got {err}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !err.to_string().contains("secret"),
+        "password leaked: {err}"
+    );
+}
+
+fn digest_401() -> String {
+    "HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\r\nWWW-Authenticate: Digest realm=\"monero-rpc\", nonce=\"abcnonce\", qop=\"auth\", algorithm=MD5\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n".into()
+}
+
+async fn serve_digest_then(listener: TcpListener, ok: String) {
+    let (mut sock, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept");
+    let mut buf = vec![0u8; 8192];
+    let _ = sock.read(&mut buf).await;
+    sock.write_all(digest_401().as_bytes()).await.expect("401");
+    drop(sock);
+
+    let (mut sock, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept2");
+    buf.fill(0);
+    let n = sock.read(&mut buf).await.unwrap_or(0);
+    let req = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..n]);
+    assert!(
+        req.contains("Authorization: Digest"),
+        "missing digest auth: {req}"
+    );
+    assert!(req.contains("username=\"ow\""), "missing user: {req}");
+    assert!(req.contains("response=\""), "missing response: {req}");
+    sock.write_all(ok.as_bytes()).await.expect("200");
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn mock_digest_auth_accepted() {
+    let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+    let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+    let canned = json_rpc_ok(
+        r#"{"address":"4AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"}"#,
+    );
+    tokio::spawn(serve_digest_then(listener, canned));
+    let w = Wallet::from_url(&format!("http://ow:s3cretPASS@127.0.0.1:{}", addr.port())).unwrap();
+    let got = w.get_address().await.expect("get_address");
+    assert!(got.starts_with('4'), "got {got}");
+}

tests/wipe.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
 //! M5: wipe messages (keep identity + friends); wipe-all is a new person.
 
-use onionwire::Store;
 use onionwire::tui::{
-    QuitDecision, QuitPrompt, WipeDecision, WipeKind, WipePrompt, parse_slash, quit_screen_text,
+    parse_slash, quit_screen_text, wipe_screen_text, QuitDecision, QuitPrompt, WipeDecision,
-    wipe_screen_text,
+    WipeKind, WipePrompt,
 };
+use onionwire::{PaymentWrite, Store};
+
+// Official mainnet standard from Monero docs (same fixture as tests/pay.rs).
+const MAINNET_STD: &str = "4AdUndXHHZ6cfufTMvppY6JwXNouMBzSkbLYfpAV5Usx3skxNgYeYTRj5UzqtReoS44qo9mtmXCqY45DJ852K5Jv2684Rge";
 
 fn pk(tag: u8) -> [u8; 32] {
     let mut k = [0u8; 32];
@@ -50,6 +53,53 @@ fn wipe_clears_messages_keeps_self_and_friends() {
     );
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn wipe_clears_payments_keeps_self_and_friends() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
+    let store = Store::open_at_with_passphrase(dir.path(), "onionwire-test").expect("open");
+    let me = store.self_identity().unwrap();
+    store
+        .upsert_friend(&pk(1), "a.onion", Some("alice"))
+        .unwrap();
+    store
+        .append_message(&pk(1), "out", b"secret-log-line-xyz")
+        .unwrap();
+    store
+        .insert_payment(
+            &pk(1),
+            PaymentWrite {
+                dir: "out",
+                kind: "receipt",
+                amount_atomic: "1000000000000",
+                address: MAINNET_STD,
+                memo: "counterparty-memo-xyz",
+                txid: Some("aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899"),
+                verified: true,
+            },
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(store.list_messages(&pk(1)).unwrap().len(), 1);
+    assert_eq!(store.list_payments(&pk(1)).unwrap().len(), 1);
+
+    store.wipe_messages().expect("wipe");
+
+    assert!(store.list_messages(&pk(1)).unwrap().is_empty());
+    assert!(
+        store.list_payments(&pk(1)).unwrap().is_empty(),
+        "wipe must drop payments, not only chat"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(store.friend_count().unwrap(), 1);
+    let f = store.get_friend(&pk(1)).unwrap().expect("friend");
+    assert_eq!(f.petname.as_deref(), Some("alice"));
+    let me2 = store.self_identity().unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(me.identity_pk, me2.identity_pk);
+    drop(store);
+    assert!(
+        !db_contains(dir.path(), b"counterparty-memo-xyz"),
+        "wipe must not leave payment memo in the db file"
+    );
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn wipe_all_removes_dir_so_next_open_is_new_identity() {
     let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
@@ -108,8 +158,9 @@ fn wipe_all_requires_typing_wipeall() {
 #[test]
 fn wipe_prompt_text_matches_spec() {
     let m = wipe_screen_text(WipeKind::Messages);
-    assert!(m.contains("Wipe message log?"));
+    assert!(m.contains("Wipe chat and payments history?"));
     assert!(m.contains("Identity key and friends stay."));
+    assert!(m.contains("Not a forensic erase."));
     assert!(m.contains("Type WIPE to confirm"));
     assert!(m.contains("Esc to cancel"));
     let a = wipe_screen_text(WipeKind::All);